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INTRODUCTION
Ten years later, the controversy and recriminations over the
1
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs)
have scarcely abated. TRIPs is now firmly enshrined as part of the
general undertaking to which all members states of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) must subscribe, supplying a new global standard
for intellectual property protection. Yet, commentators continue to
differ widely as to the origins of the TRIPs Agreement, its merits and
legitimacy, and its implications for the future of intellectual property
2
rights (IPR).
The controversy over TRIPs extends well beyond the specifics of the
Agreement or even intellectual property (IP) generally. TRIPs forms
3
part of a broader trend to globalize regulatory policy. In an era of
shrinking borders, there is a growing demand for global solutions to
global problems. Yet, shifting regulatory powers from the national to
the international level is also problematic for many reasons. Among
these are a familiar set of federalist concerns analogous to the domestic
debate here in the United States. Many question, for example, whether
the gains from centralized policies outweigh the loss of the potential
4
benefits of “state laboratories.”
Regulatory policymaking at the
international level raises additional issues relating to process, rather
than outcome. Some have argued that the “democratic deficit” inherent
in international lawmaking calls into question the very legitimacy of
5
global standards.
Even if one supports regulatory harmonization in principle, the

1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
2. See Peter Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369
(2006).
3. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION (2000) [hereinafter BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, BUSINESS REGULATION]
(analyzing trend to globalization across multiple domains of business regulation).
4. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
For the international version of this debate, see infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
Ultimately, the “federalism” question must be answered issue by issue. The case for
centralization will be stronger for some issues than others.
5. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution,
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 564 (2000) [hereinafter McGinnis & Movesian, World Trade
Constitution].
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question remains whether the WTO is the right organization for the job.
The WTO has traditionally focused on “negative integration,” i.e.,
liberalizing trade by reducing tariffs and stripping away regulatory
barriers. TRIPs signaled a controversial shift to a “positive integration”
approach that goes beyond de-regulation to affirmatively re-regulate (or
6
harmonize), imposing global standards in place of national ones.
TRIPs opponents have also challenged the WTO’s right to intrude on a
7
policy area as peripheral to global trade as IP.
TRIPs has proven just as controversial for the manner in which the
Agreement was reached. In an explicit strategy of “linkage,” protection
of IP was made a condition precedent for progress on other trade issues
8
being negotiated simultaneously during GATT’s Uruguay Round. The
6. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and the Millennium
Round, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
JOHN H. JACKSON 113–19 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000).
7. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade & the WTO, in EFFICIENCY,
EQUITY, LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 50,
58 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Bhagwati, After Seattle] (arguing that TRIPs
does not belong in a trade organization because “[i]f your only criterion for getting an issue
into the WTO is that your issue affects trade, then virtually everything gets in”). Intellectual
property had heretofore been dealt with in the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), which was and is a completely separate international regime from the WTO and its
predecessor organization, the General Agreement Trade and Tariffs (GATT). On its face,
the substantive connections between international trade and IPR, which have traditionally
been governed by territorially-bounded, national law, seemed obscure and insignificant. Nor
did the TRIPs Agreement limit its focus to the “trade related aspects” of IP as its title
suggests. Not only did the regulatory harmonization imposed by TRIPs go well beyond any
reasonable understanding of that phrase, TRIPs does not even address some of the most
obvious points at which IPR and trade do overlap, such as the reimportation of gray market
goods. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6 (leaving exhaustion of IPR up to each
member state to decide).
8. See Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending “Trade and . . .,” 96 AM.
J. INT’L L. 77, 79 (2002) (“TRIPS [represents] an archetypal, and advanced, case history of
linkage.”). The terminology of “linkage” as used in the WTO context is somewhat confused,
because the linkage can be used both in a “substantive” sense to describe institutional or
substantive connections between trade and non-trade issues as a matter of regulatory
governance, as well as a “procedural” sense to describe what may be a one-time quid pro quo
over otherwise unrelated issues in the course of negotiating a set of agreements. Such
“strategic linkage” can occur either unilaterally or by mutual consent. See generally David W.
Leebron, Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO: Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 5, 11–13
(2002) (providing a taxonomy of linkage forms). In fact, TRIPs reflects both forms of
linkage. As a substantive matter, the TRIPs Agreement served to bring international IP
protection within the ambit of world trade law, linking two issue areas that had previously
been separate. The achievement of TRIPs was, in turn, made possible by an exercise in
strategic linkage in which developing nations were induced to accept upward harmonization
of IPR in return for concessions offered in other, largely unrelated areas. This Article focuses
on the use of linkage strategies during trade negotiations and will, thus, use the term in its
second (procedural) sense.
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result was a quid pro quo in which the developed countries essentially
pushed through IP harmonization in the face of widespread objections
from developing nations in exchange for commitments by the former to
9
open their agricultural and textile markets.
These controversies swirling in the wake of TRIPs are of more than
academic or historical interest. They have led to a sharp divide in global
attitudes toward regulatory linkage that puts rich countries at odds with
the developing world and has helped spawn an atmosphere of distrust
that clouds the WTO’s broader agenda.
This Article focuses on the process issue raised by TRIPs: namely,
the use of linkage strategies to advance harmonization in the WTO.
Such “strategic linkage”—or logrolling—to negotiate tradeoffs across
disparate issues remains highly controversial. Logrolling is generally
frowned upon in domestic lawmaking as it can encourage “amoral” vote
transfers that undermine the democratic process. Instead, rules on
“single-issue” legislation serve to restrict package deals combining
10
unrelated subject matter.
By contrast, linkage has proven almost endemic to multilateral trade
negotiations—and all but unavoidable given the consensus rules under
11
which the WTO operates. Because each nation has its own mix of
export interests and protectionist lobbies, progress on liberalization can
only be achieved by trading concessions between countries with
reciprocal interests in a bilateral exchange that promises gains to both
12
sides. The WTO combines a series of such “linked” exchanges—e.g.,
9. See Yu, supra note 2 at 371–373 (describing “bargain narrative” as dominant
explanation for TRIPs based on a North-South tradeoff of IP protection for agricultural and
textile concessions, plus a commitment to binding dispute resolution). The extent to which
rich countries have, in fact, kept their side of the bargain is disputed. See id. at 373–375
(describing alternative “coercion” narrative, which posits a more unilateral exercise in
strategic linkage under less equal terms). The GATT was the WTO’s predecessor
organization. The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations ran from 1986 to 1994
and culminated in a comprehensive set of agreements of which TRIPs was one component.
10. See infra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.
11. Whereas the majority rules applicable in parliamentary systems allow a coalition of
interests behind a particular policy proposal to overcome the objections of a minority, WTO
rules permit even a single member state to block agreement. See Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1232 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Charter]. Because most proposals result in identifiable winners and losers,
the only way to stop the losers from blocking agreement is to offer a package deal with
something in it for everyone.
12. In this way, such countries each hope to gain enough political backing from their
exporters who stand to gain from liberalization in one sector to overcome opposition from
the protectionists who stand to lose in another sector. By necessity, the gain/losses must be
reciprocal in nature for each country to come out ahead in this calculus. See McGinnis &
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tariff reductions on steel in return for cuts in tobacco subsidies—in a
global package deal negotiated over the course of a multi-year “round”
of trade negotiations.
Thus, multilateral trade negotiations are
explicitly structured around multi-sectoral linkages.
The use of trade policy as a lever to achieve progress on non-trade
13
issues has a lengthy, albeit controversial pedigree. Trade sanctions
14
continue to be a widely employed tool in international relations. What
was novel about TRIPs, however, was the use of trade linkages to create
15
new international law rather than enforce existing obligations: the new
law, in this case, being an agreement to harmonize intellectual property
16
rights within the WTO itself.
Regulatory harmonization of such non-trade issues differs
significantly from the trade liberalization that has been the WTO’s
traditional focus. For one thing, regulatory standards can serve as a
vehicle for covert protectionism—the antithesis of liberalization.
Because of such differences, this Article will argue that the shift from
negative to positive integration in the WTO presents special risks that
justify procedural safeguards. While package deals remain essential to
the WTO’s mission of trade liberalization, special rules should apply
when regulatory policymaking is concerned.
Much of the harmonization debate in the WTO has focused on the
extent to which non-trade issues belong in the WTO and where to draw
17
the outer limits of its jurisdiction. Comparatively less attention has
Movesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 545–46.
13. During the Cold War, for example, the U.S. Congress linked trade privileges for
the Soviet Union to its policies on Jewish emigration. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the
1974 Trade Act formalized this practice by requiring the President to certify that the Soviet
Union had made progress on liberalizing Jewish emigration in order to be eligible for “mostfavored nation” (MFN) status as a trade partner. Until recently, a similar requirement
conditioned China’s MFN privileges on its human rights record. The ritual of annual MFN
certifications of China only ended in 2001 with China’s admission to the WTO. See HENRY J.
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,
POLITICS, MORALS 1109–1115 (2d ed. 2000).
14. Cf. Converting Damascus, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, at 14 (describing the recent
use of trade sanctions against Libya and threatened sanctions against Syria).
15. By contrast, the various boycotts and embargoes enforced by the United States and
its allies against “rogue nations” generally have a stated objective of forcing nations to
comply with existing international commitments or punishing them to the extent they have
not.
16. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, BUSINESS REGULATION, supra note 3, at 221
(“TRIPS is the only case of ‘positive’ linkage of non-trade regulatory standards to the GATT.
. . .”).
17. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 28–30 (2002);
Trachtman, supra note 8, at 77–78.
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been devoted to the process by which agreement on non-trade issues is
reached. However, this Article argues that process matters. It will
propose specific rules to regulate the use of linkage strategies to
advance regulatory harmonization of non-trade issues.
The argument will proceed in five parts. Part I situates the “linkage”
issue within the larger “constitutional” debate surrounding the WTO.
Part II examines a prominent, recent proposal to institutionalize
strategic linkage as the lynchpin of an expanded WTO. After
considering the proposal’s potential to overcome distributional skews
that block single-issue negotiations, this Article assesses the proposal’s
possible pitfalls and unintended effects. In particular, it argues that
linkage may encourage tactical abuses, create logistical obstacles, give
rise to regulatory protectionism, and undermine the WTO’s legitimacy.
Part III then analyzes the TRIPs Agreement as a case study to evaluate
these risks. It concludes that some degree of regulatory linkage may be
a necessarily evil, but only if the downsides can be minimized. The risks
of linkage, both specific and systemic, may thus justify some form of
formal controls. Part IV next considers substantive approaches to
control strategic linkage, ranging from a total ban to a limiting criterion
of “mutual gain.” Rather than searching for substantive criteria to
evaluate linkage proposals, however, this Article argues in Part V that
the better approach is to rely on procedural mechanisms to accomplish
this screening. Regulatory proposals would need to demonstrate
support among a significant subset of WTO Members to “pre-qualify”
for inclusion in a trade round. Ensuring such “pre-commitment” on the
part of WTO Members would improve both the quality and legitimacy
of regulatory agreements negotiated under future trade rounds. It
would also promote greater confidence in the multilateral system.
I. TRIPS, REGULATORY LINKAGE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE
WTO
TRIPs was born as part of the “big bang” in world trade law
emerging from the Uruguay Round, which witnessed the creation of the
18
WTO itself and an ambitious expansion of the GATT treaty system.
18. The Uruguay Round was part of a succession of periodic “trade rounds” conducted
under the auspices of the GATT system in which multilateral negotiators meeting over a
course of years arrived at global package deals on tariff reductions and trade regulation. In
addition to the agreements on the WTO and TRIPs, the Uruguay Round culminated in
several other landmark agreements, including, inter alia, the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), which expanded GATT principles for the first time to the service sector,
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), a similar (more
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In the wake of these historic achievements, commentators have argued
over the extent to which global trade law has reached a “constitutional
19
moment.” After Uruguay, many saw the WTO as poised to make the
same leap as the European Community made from a multilateral treaty
organization to a more organically integrated organ of supranational
20
governance. Although such euphoric visions faded in the dramatic
21
failure of the Seattle Ministerial Conference four years later, the
“constitutional” questions remained as WTO Members and
commentators engaged in a collective soul searching over the WTO’s
22
purpose and future.
In undertaking a sweeping harmonization of an issue at best only
tangentially related to trade, TRIPs both expanded the WTO’s
jurisdictional reach and signaled a dramatic turn towards positive
23
integration. As commentators debate the feasibility and desirability of
tentative) agreement on foreign investment, an agreement to phase out textile quotas, and
major new disciplines governing subsidies, anti-dumping duties, safeguard measures, health
and safety standards, and technical barriers. All of which formed part of the single
undertaking to which all WTO Members were obliged to subscribe. Two additional
agreements on government procurement and aviation were concluded on a plurilateral basis.
19. See Peter Holmes, The WTO and the EU: Some Constitutional Comparisons, in
THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 59, 76 (Gráinne de Búrca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2001); Neil Walker, Constitutionalism in a New Key, in the WTO and the
EU: Some Constitutional Comparisons, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, supra, at 31.
20. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 6, at 118 (arguing that WTO harmonization
“requires, as in European integration law, a progressive ‘constitutionalization’ of GATT and
WTO law”). See generally THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES,
supra note 19 (comparing WTO and EU regimes).
21. See Thomas Cottier, Limits to International Trade: The Constitutional Challenge,
94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 220, 220 (2000).
22. See id. at 221.
23. See Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra note 7, at 58; Daniel Kalderimis, Problems of
WTO Harmonization and the Virtues of Shields Over Swords, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
304, 329 (2004); see also Petersmann, supra note 6, at 114 (noting the further anomaly that
unlike prior trade agreements that have focused on public law, TRIPs mandates the
enforcement of private rights in a purely domestic context). But see KEITH E. MASKUS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 239 (2000) (arguing that IP
is sufficiently trade-related to justify inclusion in the WTO); John O. McGinnis & Mark L.
Movsesian, Against Global Governance in the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353 (2004)
[hereinafter McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance]. In contrast to TRIPs’
unabashedly comprehensive and intrusive scope, the WTO’s other ventures into regulatory
harmonization have, by comparison, been more circumspect. The regulatory authority
asserted in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
and Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) is largely indirect, serving as a
defensive measure to insulate trade from regulatory protectionism, while the TRIMs
Agreement is largely declaratory of pre-existing principles. See Kalderimis, supra note 23, at
329–31 (distinguishing between “defensive” and “progressive” harmonization); id. at 333
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incorporating a broader range of policy concerns into the legal and
institutional machinery of the WTO, TRIPs naturally plays a pivotal
24
role in this debate. Some see the TRIPs Agreement as one of the
25
WTO’s chief accomplishments and a major innovation in international
26
trade law. Even those who disagree with TRIPs often see it as a
template for regulatory policymaking by the WTO on issues they do
27
28
support. Others see the Agreement as, at best, an unfortunate detour
29
or cautionary tale, and, at worst, the embodiment of all that is wrong
30
with the WTO. As noted, these differences in opinion are more than
(regarding TRIMs).
24. See Charnovitz, supra note 17 (providing analytic framework to evaluate claims for
regulatory linkage).
25. See, e.g., EDMOND MCGONUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION §§ 21.211,
21.21-1 (1995) (“The conclusion of the . . . TRIPS Agreement was perhaps the most
remarkable achievement of the Uruguay Round.”).
26. See, e.g., MASKUS, supra note 23, at 2 (describing the TRIPs Agreement’s
importance as “the first multilateral trade accord that aims at achieving partial harmonization
in an extensive area of business regulation [that] forms the vanguard of efforts to establish
deep integration of domestic regulatory policies among countries”).
27. Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 29; Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 342; see also
Frederick M. Abbott, Distributed Governance at the WTO-WIPO, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON, supra note 6,
at 25–33 [hereinafter Abbott, Distributed Governance] (exploring the division of labor
between TRIPs and WIPO as a model for further regulatory expansion by the WTO);
Andrew Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303 (2004) (citing
TRIPs as an example of the benefits of linkage).
28. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 19, at 76; Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 305, 346
(calling for a moratorium on further regulatory harmonization by the WTO).
29. See, e.g., Kalderimis, supra note 22, at 342–43 (pointing to conflict over AIDS
pharmaceutical patents as an example of the unbalanced weighting of priorities arising from
forced regulatory harmonization); Petersmann, supra note 6, at 122 (citing the one-sided
regulatory balance struck under TRIPs as an example of distorted policymaking likely to be
enacted under current WTO procedures).
30. See, e.g., Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra note 7, at 59 (describing TRIPs as an
unwanted “third limb” that will impede progress on trade liberalization); Francis Mangeni,
Implementing the TRIPS Agreement in Africa, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 219, 230 (Christophe Bellman et al.
eds., 2003) (describing TRIPs as “in essence written by developed country industry lobbies”
at the risk of “[i]mpoverishing and leaving destitute entire populations in developing
countries”). The disastrous campaign recently waged by U.S. pharmaceutical companies to
enforce patent rights over AIDS medication has only intensified perceptions of TRIPs as the
ugly face of trade-driven globalization. See, e.g., K. Balasubramaniam, Access to Medicines
and Public Policy Safeguards Under TRIPS, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra, at 135. Pharmaceutical
patents are not the only aspect of intellectual property protection that have attracted the ire
of globalization opponents. Trademark and copyright enforcement, also expanded by TRIPs,
are viewed as paving the way for the “Coca-Cola-ization” and “Disneysification” of the
planet. See generally Rosemary J. Coombe, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
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academic. The unresolved North-South split over TRIPs and its legacy
hangs over the WTO as a focus of discord and distrust.
These contrasting perspectives on TRIPs to some extent reflect
different normative conceptions of the WTO. Commentators who see
the WTO as following the evolution of the European Community from
common market to political union welcome a positive integration
31
agenda as part of a deepening commitment to world governance.
Some have openly called for the WTO to embrace its de facto role as
32
global regulator.
Other commentators regard regulatory
harmonization as inherently suspect and have counseled the WTO to
33
stick to its core mission of trade liberalization.
Such opposing viewpoints can, in turn, be traced to differing
conceptions of linkage. For some, package deal-making in the WTO is a
win-win proposition that makes it a natural choice as an organ of world
34
governance.
Others see the potential abuses of logrolling as an
35
argument against regulatory harmonization.
This Article critically examines such contrasting views on linkage,
using TRIPs as a case study. It finds merit on both sides of the
argument, viewing strategic linkage as a double-edged sword. Linkage
provides a powerful tool to negotiate reciprocal concessions across
unrelated policy areas. However, unrestricted use of linkage can lead to
sub-optimal outcomes—with TRIPs arguably serving as a case in point.
Ultimately, using package deals to enact regulatory standards on nontrade issues may sometimes prove a necessary evil. However, the
procedurally suspect nature of such deals demands special rules to
regulate them.
In some respects, the specific procedural proposal advanced here
parallels efforts by other commentators to address the “democracy

PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW, 52–55 (1998) (describing how
IPR facilitate the domination of global culture by a handful of multinational conglomerates);
Naomi Klein, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES (2001) (criticizing the global
branding phenomenon as perpetuating an oppressive and exploitative corporate hegemony).
31. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 19; Joanne Scott, International Trade and
Environmental Governance: Relating Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the WTO, 15 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 307, 308–12 (2004); Walker, supra note 19. But see Kalderimis, supra note 23, at
341–43 (arguing that the WTO lacks the democratic legitimacy to emulate the European
Union).
32. Guzman, supra note 27, at 307–08; Marco Bronckers, More Power to the WTO, 4 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 41, 45 nn.15–20 (2001) (somewhat more tentatively).
33. McGinnis & Movesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 552–66.
34. Bronckers, supra note 32, at 45 nn.15–16; Guzman, supra note 27, at 316–21.
35. See McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 355.
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deficit” inherent in the WTO’s exercise of regulatory authority.
However, their solutions have generally involved “constitutionalizing”
the WTO in ways that would fundamentally alter the nature of the
organization: either by entrenching binding norms such as a respect for
fundamental rights, creating new mechanisms for participation by civil
society and/or national parliamentarians, or even moving to some form
36
of direct electoral representation.
The proposal that this Article
makes, however, entails a more modest, sub-constitutional solution,
analogous to the parliamentary rules that govern domestic lawmaking.
It would merely require harmonization proposals to undergo a “prequalifying” procedure before they could be linked into multilateral
trade negotiations. To prepare the ground for this proposal, it is first
necessary to consider more carefully the pros and cons of linkage.
II. DOUBLE OR NOTHING: THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF STRATEGIC
LINKAGE
One of the strongest endorsements of linkage in the WTO appears
in Andrew Guzman’s recent article entitled Global Governance and the
37
WTO. Guzman envisions an expanded, restructured WTO that would
serve as a forum in which international negotiators could address trade
38
and non-trade issue alike.
One of Guzman’s main arguments for
centralizing such negotiations within a single umbrella organization is
that it would facilitate strategic linkage that would make possible a
broader range of international agreements than if such negotiations
remained compartmentalized in separate single-issue forums. Guzman
sees linkage as enabling creative tradeoffs to the mutual benefit of the
international community. Guzman is hardly the first to contemplate
39
such benefits. However, his article proposes an innovative institutional

36. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 6, at 122–25; Peter Van den Bossche & Iveta
Alexovicova, Effective Global Economic Governance by the World Trade Organization, 8 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 667, 672–683 (2005). See generally THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, supra note 19 (considering the potential for the WTO to evolve
into a supranational regime akin to the EU and addressing concerns over democracy deficits
in both contexts).
37. Guzman, supra note 27.
38. Guzman envisions issue areas being divided into separate departments within the
expanded WTO, with single-issue agreements being negotiated at the department level. Id.
at 307–08. The real innovation of Guzman’s plan, however, concerns his proposed “MegaRounds,” in which free-wheeling negotiations would encourage concessions across issue
areas. Id. at 308.
39. See Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 31 (quoting WTO Director-General Mike Moore
as urging “governments to ‘broaden the negotiating agenda’” to enable cross-issue
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mechanism to facilitate cross-issue linkages.
Guzman’s vision for the WTO is by no means confined to strategic
linkage. His proposal calls for a “World Economic Organization” that
would permanently entrench an expanded range of issues under the
WTO’s authority. Guzman justifies this ambitious proposal by arguing
that ongoing conflicts between trade and non-trade issues can only be
resolved by bringing all such concerns within the jurisdiction of a single
international regime that can address them on an equal footing. Such
consolidation would facilitate an integrated approach to regulatory
policymaking that could craft comprehensive global solutions to
40
complex global problems.
Much of his article describes the
institutional restructuring necessary to achieve the expanded, revamped
WTO he envisions.
Guzman presents a well thought-out, forward-looking essay that
provides much food for discussion. This Article addresses only the
linkage aspects of Guzman’s proposal. It argues that the case for
encouraging strategic linkage as a means to advance regulatory
harmonization is more qualified than Guzman suggests. First, there
may be less need for cross-issue tradeoffs than Guzman assumes.
Second, in addition to opening the door to otherwise unattainable
outcomes, strategic linkage may also result in blocking equally desirable
agreements. Third, the benefits afforded by such negotiated tradeoffs
may be outweighed by potential negatives. Indeed, the potential for
41
sub-optimal outcomes to arise from linkage strategies justifies formal
limitations on their use. A future “World Economic Organization” of
the type Guzman envisions would be wise to adopt procedural
safeguards to restrict such practices.
Guzman’s case for strategic linkage hinges on his observation that
negotiations within the framework of a single-issue regime sometimes
flounder over skewed distributional outcomes: i.e., when a proposed
agreement disproportionately burdens certain nations and benefits
others. Particularly when unanimity is required (or virtual unanimity as

concessions that will increase the chance of a successful trade agreement).
40. Guzman, supra note 27, at 305–07.
41. This Article will refer to such concepts as “optimality,” “global welfare,”
“desirability,” “aggregate benefit,” etc., more or less synonymously to describe favorable
policy outcomes from the standpoint of the international community as a whole, judged in the
broadest possible sense. It does not propose specific definitions or yardsticks to assess them
(nor does Guzman). The argument that follows is therefore contingent on the assumption
that the range of available definitions for these concepts will yield an area of overlap on
which most people could agree.
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in the WTO), important policy initiatives may, thus, remain stymied,
42
even if the world as a whole would undeniably benefit from action.
Guzman suggests that linkage can overcome such obstacles by
“compensating” those nations that are disadvantaged by a policy
43
initiative in one area with offsetting concessions in unrelated areas.
Guzman offers TRIPs as a successful example of tradeoffs that
resulted in mutual benefit. He observes that proposals for a treaty
enforcing mandatory IPR languished for years in the WIPO in the face
of opposition from developing nations that, as net IP importers, would
44
bear the costs of increased IP protection. By offering such nations
concessions in other trade sectors, Guzman sees linkage as having
45
facilitated a win-win solution.
Leaving aside the question of whether TRIPs really was a “win-win”
outcome, as a descriptive matter, Guzman’s account of the potential for
linkage to overcome distributional skews seems correct. Whether the
experience of TRIPs can be generalized to justify an endorsement of
cross-issue linkages to advance other regulatory goals remains to be
seen. First of all, it is worth noting that linkage across issue areas is not
the only way of overcoming skewed distributional outcomes. Creative
tradeoffs and burden-sharing mechanisms can sometimes be devised
within a given policy domain. The carbon trading regime established
under the Kyoto Agreement on Global Warming offers one such
example, providing a market-driven mechanism to share the burdens of
46
preventing global warming. Similar solutions may be available in many
42. Guzman gives the example of an agreement to prevent deforestation that would
benefit the international community by slowing global warming and preserving biodiversity,
but would put a disproportionate burden of securing such benefits on Brazil. Guzman, supra
note 27, at 318. Even if the agreement was in Brazil’s long-term interest, it might prove
politically untenable for Brazil to accept all the pain for a shared global gain.
43. Id. In Guzman’s deforestation example, Brazil would receive trade concessions in
some of its export markets to act as the sweetener that would cinch the environmental deal.
See Leebron, supra note 8, at 26 (noting that linkage “offers the potential to expand the
means by which mutuality can be achieved, and thus enhances the ability to reach an
agreement”).
44. See Guzman, supra note 27, at 317; see also Meir P. Pugatch, The International
Regulation of IPRs in a TRIPS and TRIPS-plus World, 6 J. WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 431,
435 (2005) (providing empirical data confirming that the distribution of patents rights
overwhelmingly favors developed nations). Mandatory enforcement of IPR can be expected
to result in increased monopoly rents paid by developing nations to IPR holders located
primarily in rich countries. Although TRIPs advocates dangled the prospect of increased
foreign investment as a compensating factor, almost no one seriously expected such promises
to fully offset the costs.
45. Guzman, supra note 27, at 316–17.
46. Carbon trading provides an incentive for richer countries to “buy” carbon emission
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47

other policy areas.
It is true that there would remain desirable policy outcomes for
which the scope for burden-sharing mechanisms is structurally
constrained. The harmonization of intellectual property protection may
48
have been one such example. However, even if linkage could provide
a way out in such cases, it is far from clear that the potential gains
outweigh the risks. There is no guarantee that linkage would be
restricted to the limited set of cases in which a desirable policy is
blocked by distributional skews. While the benefits would primarily be
captured in those cases, the negative consequences of encouraging
linkage could prove to be systemic.
While opening the door to cross-issue concessions increases the
range of possible tradeoffs and, thus, expands the set of outcomes
theoretically available, it does not follow, however, that more
agreements would necessarily result.
Linkage claims could
inadvertently disrupt progress in sectors in which agreement was

credits by investing in cost-effective emission reduction in less efficient and dirtier industries
in the developing world. This burden-sharing mechanism enables rich countries to subsidize
emission control technologies in rapidly industrializing nations in the developing world that
would pose a prohibitive cost to the latter on their own. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword:
The Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 126, 134 (2002) [hereinafter Bhagwati,
Symposium].
47. See id. (describing a similar burden-sharing solution to protect turtles whereby rich
countries would purchase turtle excluder devices for use by shrimp fishermen from
developing nations); Leebron, supra note 8, at 14 (providing further examples of single-issue
offsets and burden-sharing).
48. The nature of IPR as private forms of quasi-property make burden-sharing
mechanisms vastly more difficult, while the distributional skews associated with such rights
are more extreme than with carbon emission controls. It is not entirely inconceivable to
envision an alternative to TRIPs that might have been devised so as to overcome the
misgivings of the developing world without extrinsic offsets. Some forms of IPR would
arguably benefit developing nations. For example, recognizing IPR in traditional knowledge
would favor developing nations. Conditioning IPR on reciprocal transfers of technology
could offset the burden of paying monopoly rents. Even within the current structure of
TRIPs, commentators have pointed out a number of modifications, ranging from fees
concessions on patent applications to increased technical assistance and burden sharing on
enforcement costs, which could result in a more equitable agreement. See Carlos Correa,
Formulating Effective Pro-Development National Intellectual Property Policies, in TRADING
IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY,
supra note 30, at 209, 210; J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or
Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 452, 465–68
(2000). Nonetheless, the experience in WIPO illustrates the daunting task of forging such a
consensus. One could also argue that any compromise solution would require the underlying
rights to be diluted to such an extent that the benefits of TRIPs would themselves be
compromised.
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otherwise feasible. The breakdowns at the recent Cancún and Seattle
ministerials may provide examples of such disruptive effects that should
be balanced against the successful linkage practiced during the Uruguay
Round. In Seattle, attempts to force human rights and labor law onto
50
the trade agenda provoked a revolt by developing countries.
In
Cancún, the so-called “Singapore” issues—among them competition
(antitrust), foreign investment, and government procurement—played a
51
central role in the collapse of negotiations.
Facilitating linkage might also encourage certain actors to engage in
opportunistic forms of strategic behavior. For example, a country might
engage in a “holdout” strategy, blocking an agreement on issues to
which it has no intrinsic objection in order to gain negotiating leverage
52
elsewhere. Linkage claims could also provide a convenient device to
sabotage progress on other issues without the need to oppose them
53
openly. The European Union has been accused of playing such a game
in the current Doha Round to avoid making good on its promises of
54
agricultural concessions. Widespread abuse of such tactics might result
in fewer agreements rather than more.
Even without such bad faith intent, the logistical complexities of
multi-directional negotiations across an increased set of issues in the
largely unregulated “bazaar” that GATT/WTO rounds foster could
potentially be staggering. Without controls on who could link what to
where and when, paralysis might ensue, as Guzman himself
55
acknowledges.

49. Leebron, supra note 8, at 25.
50. See Bhagwati, Symposium, supra note 46, at 128 (ascribing failure of Seattle talks to
linkage).
51. See The WTO Under Fire: Why Did the World Trade Talks in Mexico Fall Apart?
And Who Is to Blame?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2003, at 26–28 [hereinafter WTO Under Fire].
As in Seattle, the split over the Singapore issues at Cancún was largely along North-South
lines. See id.
52. Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 31 n.18 (quoting Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-Making in
the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 275, 293
(2001)); Leebron, supra note 8, at 25.
53. The WTO’s consensus rules otherwise require blocking nations to voice active
opposition to a proposal, a stance that in some cases they might be reluctant to take for any
number of reasons, such as a need to honor previous commitments (or at least be seen to),
appeasement of domestic lobbies, or a perceived vulnerability on other issues.
54. See Robert D. Hormats, Governance of the Global Trading System, in EFFICIENCY,
EQUITY, LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM,
supra note 7, at 392, 399 (describing suspicion “that the EU has ulterior motives in wanting a
broader round with several controversial items on the agenda”).
55. See Guzman, supra note 27, at 310 (“An increase in the number of topics within the
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Guzman seeks to avert this danger primarily by calling for single56
issue negotiations within a specialized departmental structure.
Negotiations carried out during periodic “Departmental Rounds” would
be confined to the specific subject-matter of each department. Guzman
argues that such “Departmental Rounds” would take the pressure off
separately conducted, multi-issue “Mega Rounds” by eliminating the
need to address every issue within an “all-at-once” negotiating
structure.
If the division of labor between “Departmental” and “Mega
Rounds” could be optimized, this dual format structure could
potentially offer the best of both worlds. Agreements conducive to
single-issue resolution could be addressed departmentally, while “Mega
Rounds” would be reserved for impasses that defied single-issue
57
solutions.
However, Guzman’s proposal fails to provide any
channeling mechanism to guide negotiations to the appropriate level
and, thus, offers no assurances that the right allocations would be made.
In particular, Guzman’s assumption that “many valuable
agreements” would be achieved departmentally seems misplaced. He
justifies this assumption on historical grounds, noting that “virtually all
international negotiations on regulatory matters undertaken to date . . .
58
have addressed only a single issue area.”
Yet, historically,
international negotiators have not had recourse to a multi-issue forum
that enables cost-free recourse to linkage strategy. For most of the postwar period, single-issue regimes operated within discrete, well-defined

WTO’s jurisdiction increases the set of potential deals, the number of negotiators, and the
number of relevant interests at stake. At best, attempting to conduct all negotiations
simultaneously would be inefficient. At worst, it might be paralyzing.”). Guzman’s fatalistic
conclusion that “[c]omplexity is the inevitable result of trying to tackle the difficult problem
of how to balance competing interests at a global level” offers little reassurance or
consolation. Id. at 312.
56. Guzman also makes the following prediction:
WTO members would limit the range of issues to be discussed in the same way they
do with WTO negotiating rounds today, i.e. they would have preliminary discussions
to set out a work program for negotiations. Though the work program may be
changed as the negotiations proceed, as happened during the Uruguay Round
negotiations, it helps member to focus on a common set of questions.
Guzman, supra note 27, at 308 n.30 (citation omitted). The assumption that not every
possible issue would enter the ring on any given round may be correct. However, this says
very little about how Members would decide which issues get nominated for discussion. As
Guzman notes, existing WTO practice is rather variable on this score.
57. Cf. Leebron, supra note 8, at 27 (noting that “[i]n most situations, linkage is a
second-best solution”).
58. See Guzman, supra note 27, at 310.
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boundaries with few institutional mechanisms for cross-regime
59
The availability of Guzman’s “Mega Rounds” would
interchange.
dramatically lower the transaction costs for nations to engage in
strategic linkage both by facilitating the logistics and legitimizing the
practice. The temptation to use linkage strategies to barter around
roadblocks could undercut the commitment of departmental negotiators
to pursue the hard compromises and creative maneuvering necessary to
reach a single-issue solution while increasing the temptation to engage
in opportunistic “holdout” tactics aimed at leveraging concessions
elsewhere. Over time, more and more policy matters would become
dependent on multi-issue resolutions.
Furthermore, even if linkage could facilitate the resolution of
difficult issues, it also does not follow that the agreements through
linkage achieved would necessarily be desirable ones. In many cases,
skewed distributional outcomes may be a sign that the world as whole
would not be better off with the proposed initiative, despite the
preferences of some subset of its member states. An agreement to
harmonize labor regulations at rich country standards with high
minimum wages and restrictions on working hours might be one
example. Such an agreement would force developing nations to forfeit
an important comparative advantage in the world marketplace and
could result in a net loss in aggregate welfare. Similar criticisms have
been lodged at the upward harmonization of IPR mandated by TRIPs,
60
which some see as impeding rather than promoting global innovation.
Indeed, the case for the regulatory harmonization is rarely
61
unequivocal even without distributional imbalances.
There is no
reason to believe that nations would confine their harmonization efforts
to the most “deserving” cases, even assuming one could tell which is

59. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral
Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, LEGITIMACY:
THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 7, at 264, 266.
60. See infra notes 120–141 and accompanying text.
61. International harmonization may reduce transaction costs to global traders.
Petersmann, supra note 6, at 119. However, it has to be balanced against the costs. See id.
Some issues may be better left regulated at the national or local level for several reasons: to
better address local contexts or to respond to changing conditions. There is also a case for
encouraging experimentation and regulatory competition across national regimes. See
Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, “Subsidiarity” in the WTO Context from a Legal Perspective, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H.
JACKSON, supra note 6, at 36 (exploring subsidiarity in the European Union as a model of
regulatory federalism for WTO); McGinnis & Movesian, World Trade Constitution, supra
note 5, at 552–62.
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which. Indeed, countries benefiting from the skewed outcomes would
have a built-in incentive to push regulatory harmonization regardless of
global welfare. That such negotiations would take place in an
organization dominated by trade concerns would have its own
62
disruptive effects. Nations would be tempted to subvert negotiations
over regulatory policy to serve mercantilist ends, exacerbating rather
63
than ameliorating the distributional skews of regulatory outcomes.
Unrestricted use of trade linkage could provide them the leverage to
impose harmonization measures under all sorts of sub-optimal
conditions.
Even if regulatory efforts were confined to policy areas in which a
strong theoretical case for harmonization exists, there is still a risk that
the sort of package deals that Guzman contemplates could yield
undesirable outcomes due to “regulatory capture” by special interests.
It is no accident that virtually all parliamentary systems have rules
against vote trading as well as restrictions on the scope of legislative
64
acts. “Germaneness” requirements or “single-subject” rules serve to
improve clarity and accountability by forcing legislators to vote on a
coherent set of proposals focused on addressing an identifiable issue.
Restricting legislation to a single issue also makes it easier to weigh
costs against benefits on an apples-to-apples basis, improving the quality
65
of deliberation. In the absence of such safeguards, special interests can
66
more easily manipulate legislation to serve their private interests. Such
62. To be fair, Guzman recognizes the need to re-balance the WTO to ensure that
trade concerns no longer dominate. Guzman, supra note 27, at 332–33. However, it is not
clear that there is an easy remedy. By its very nature, trade intersects with an enormous
variety of issues, and the reality is that trade lobbies tend to speak with a louder voice than
other constituents. Combining issue regimes under a single roof would make it easier for
trade functionaries to monitor and meddle in negotiations carried out in other policy sectors.
63. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the
Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 219–20 (1998) (describing policy distortion arising from
reconceptualization of IP as a trade issue).
64. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 82 (1989); Millard H. Ruud, No Law
Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. REV. 389–90 (1958) (tracing such scope
limitations date back to ancient Rome).
65. The formal basis of such rules varies. In some systems, the rules remain implicit
within parliamentary custom. Several states in the United States, however, require “singleissue” legislation as a constitutional requirement. See generally Ruud, supra note 64
(surveying state provisions).
66. This can occur several ways. An existing piece of legislation can be “hijacked” by
some unrelated provision in which its objectionable nature is either hidden or simply not
worth fighting over. Custom-built coalitions can be manufactured through manipulations of
agenda. And “poison pills” can be inserted to torpedo measures that would otherwise attract
widespread support. See, e.g., Madison Nat’l Bank v. Newrath, 275 A.2d 495 (Md. 1971)

PAGER - FORMATTED

3/3/2006 12:51:11 PM

232 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:2

rules also serve to restrict the scope for linkage—or “logrolling” as it is
often called in legislative contexts—by preventing package deals that
67
Logrolling is generally regarded as
lock in reciprocal bargains.
contrary to democratic principles because it encourages “amoral vote
transfers” by legislators who no longer base their decisions on the merits
68
of individual bills.
The assumption that such restrictions lead to better legislation is
arguably demonstrated in the legislative habits of the U.S. Congress.
Large omnibus legislation and/or budgetary authorizations serve as
perennial magnets for “pork,” because they involve package deals in
which “riders” advancing private interests can easily evade scrutiny or at
69
least logroll their way past opposition. Such pork-barrel politics is
harder to practice when individual bills are confined to relatively narrow
issues.
Domestic legislatures also incorporate a number of other procedural
safeguards designed to improve the deliberative process, prevent last
70
minute surprises, and guard against capture by special interests.
Committee systems, bicameralism, executive vetoes, multiple reading
requirements, limits on floor amendments—all of these checks and
balances serve to slow down the legislative process and provide more
71
points of entry for democratic inputs. The absence of such procedural
protections at the international level should make logrolling even more
suspect when used to negotiate treaties.
(discussing dangers of mixed-purpose legislation).
67. It is impossible to eliminate logrolling entirely as such deals can still be made
informally. However, by forcing separate votes on individual bills, legislators become
accountable for their choices on an issue-specific basis, making naked vote trading a more
costly proposition. Moreover, preventing package deals makes logrolls more uncertain by
raising the possibility of defections during the course of sequential voting, as well as the
chance that the separate bills might not pass on their own. See MUELLER, supra note 64, at
82, 85; Ruud, supra note 64, at 391.
68. McGinnis & Movesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 355; see
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 123 (1999) (“With relatively few
exceptions logrolling phenomena have been viewed as deviations from the orderly working of
the democratic process.”).
69. See MUELLER, supra note 64, at 84; WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 127–30 (4th ed. 2005).
The energy and transportation bills recently enacted by the current Congress offer especially
grotesque examples of such perversion of public legislation.
70. State legislatures tend to have the strongest procedural safeguards, reflecting the
tradition of part-time citizen legislators who had only limited time to devote to monitoring
legislation and were prone to capture by special interests. Id. at 1014–15.
71. Id. at 130, 1014–15, 1029.
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Moreover, the democratic shortcomings of international lawmaking
raise added dangers. As John McGinnis and Mark Movsesian have
observed, the political economy of international regulation makes it
72
especially vulnerable to sub-optimal outcomes. “Interest groups have
73
substantially more power at the global than at the domestic level.”
The ability of private citizens and public interest watchdogs to monitor
backroom deals and to control abuses is greatly reduced in the
international sphere. International negotiations take place in physically
remote settings, follow obscure procedures, and may involve foreign
languages. Thus, “[a]verage citizens find the international process even
74
more opaque than domestic lawmaking.”
By contrast, organized
special interests often employ international lobbyists and enjoy
privileged access to their national delegations. At the same time, “the
75
global scale of regulation allows greater rents for interest groups.”
McGinnis and Movsesian also worry that if the WTO expands its
regulatory authority as Guzman envisions, “departmental staffers
themselves may have interests that diverge from the interests of their
76
appointing authorities.” Such concerns may be premature given the
tight leash on which member states have traditionally kept trade
77
Yet, even without such agency problems, vesting
negotiations.
regulatory policy in international bodies necessarily entails a loss of
78
democratic accountability. Voters must depend on unelected officials,

72. See McGinnis & Movesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 355;
McGinnis & Movesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 556–58.
73. McGinnis & Movesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 357.
74. Id. But see BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, BUSINESS REGULATION, supra note 3, at
606–07 (arguing that in some circumstances international regulatory policymaking can
promote transparency and resist regulatory capture by national lobbies).
75. Id.
76. Id. (“Given the technical and esoteric nature of much of their work, staffers may
eventually constitute a distinctive class with a distinctive interest—growing the regulatory
apparatus of the WTO—that does not reflect the goals of domestic governments, let alone the
general public.”).
77. Empirical work by Greg Shaffer casts doubt on the extent to which the WTO
conforms to a paradigm of centralized policymaking driven by supranational actors. He
demonstrates that member nations have zealously guarded their ability to control trade
agendas and have deliberately confined the scope of the WTO Secretariat to a relatively
minimalist role. Gregory S. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge:
Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment
Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 56–61 (2001).
78. Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why
Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, LEGITIMACY: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 7, at 227, 241–42;
Keohane & Nye, supra note 59, at 283–85.
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who are often subject to far less legislative oversight than regulatory
79
policymakers at the domestic level, to represent their interests.
Policies must be arrived at by consensus between nations that represent
a diversity of constituencies whose shared commitments cannot be
80
presumed. Relying on linkage to force agreements on issues when the
81
divergence in viewpoint is too great invites perceptions of illegitimacy.
When unilateral exercises in linkage result in unequal outcomes,
accusations of coercion can also arise. There are, thus, systemic costs to
relying on linkage to force through one-sided harmonization.
For all of these reasons, international regulation must be treated
with suspicion, particularly when negotiated through logrolling. Unlike
private contracts that can be presumed to yield mutual benefits,
regulatory bargains between nations can easily result in “amoral wealth
82
transfers” between private interests of dubious benefit. The use of
linkage strategies to lower the transaction costs and overcome
distributional roadblocks to harmonization heightens the danger.
“[E]very government has protectionist interests to pay off and
regulatory bargaining would permit the logrolling of their disparate
83
interests.”
The WTO may be particularly susceptible to such distortions of
79. See DONALD G. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL
CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 123 (2004)
(describing how trade negotiators drawn from the “elite” in developing nations were
“captured” by the pro-IP paradigm peddled by TRIPs proponents leading them to accept
protection standards contrary to the interests of their countrymen). In the United States, as
in most other countries, foreign policy (and especially trade policy) remain the preserve of
the executive, and Congress has far less opportunity for input. Trade agreements are
typically subject to a single, up-or-down vote, with no opportunity to amend specific
provisions. Unlike domestic regulations that can easily be overridden by congressional
statute, international agreements have an equal status to statutory law (and indeed, in several
countries, treaties enjoy a higher status).
80. See Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 343 (arguing that the WTO lacks the “social
legitimacy” to act in regulatory matters on behalf of a diverse global community); McGinnis
& Movesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 564 (“If the WTO were to assume a
regulatory function, its legitimacy problem would be far more acute. Quite simply, there is
no global demos.”).
81. See Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 343. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 79–124 (2d ed. 1994) (distinguishing between primary and secondary norms and
arguing that instantiation of the latter without agreement on the former is fundamentally
illegitimate).
82. McGinnis & Movesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 355.
83. Id. at 358. The fact that such deals would be subject to the consensus requirements
of the WTO provides no assurance that any such consensus among national representatives is
actually reflective of the interests of the broader publics in whose name they speak. Id. at
357–58.
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policy. Transparency has never been the norm at the WTO, and
84
participation by civil society organizations is virtually non-existent.
The single-undertaking, package deals typical of trade rounds make
85
logrolling a necessity. The complex backroom deal-making required to
reach agreement also makes it especially difficulty to track hidden
(possibly last-minute) bargains. Yet, once enacted, such bargains are
difficult to revise; the consensus principle on which the WTO operates
virtually ensures regulatory lock-in because a single nation can block
86
attempts to revisit the issue.
The WTO’s consensus requirement also encourages deliberately
ambiguous compromises such that the contents of which can be
87
selectively advertised by politicians to their constituents.
This
combination of fuzzy language and package deals makes it hard to keep
track of who is getting what from where. This disadvantages nations
with limited resources and hinders efforts to ensure democratic
accountability in general.
The democratic deficit inherent in
international lawmaking is further exacerbated by the use of
streamlined domestic procedures to implement trade agreements, such
as the U.S. “fast track” authority, which significantly impairs the
88
opportunity for legislative oversight.
Under the GATT’s original focus on trade liberalization, these
shortcomings did not arise.
By limiting its remit to “negative
integration” through prohibitions on trade barriers and progressive
opening of markets, the GATT ensured mutually beneficial welfare
89
gains.
The reciprocal basis on which such trade liberalization
proceeded helped to blunt protectionist lobbies by pitting exporter
interests against them. Moreover, far from enabling “regulatory
capture,” trade liberalization is aimed at eliminating regulatory
90
barriers.
Under these conditions, GATT’s functionalist traditions—
privileging insider dealings over transparency and democratic input—

84. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 59, at 270–72.
85. Trade rounds have varied as to the degree to which all agreements reached are
subject to the single-undertaking rules. However, at least the core tariff bindings have been
consistently subject to this rule of multiple reciprocal tradeoffs negotiated multilaterally and
agreed to collectively.
86. McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 358.
87. See generally Holmes, supra note 19, at 65; Petersmann, supra note 6, at 124.
88. McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 540.
89. Petersmann, supra note 6, at 112.
90. See McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 544–48.
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aroused little concern. Giving trade experts carte blanche to engage in
backroom horse trades was seen as advancing enlightened technocratic
91
policy. In the long run, the theory of comparative advantage ensured
that trade liberalization would benefit all participants, while the
principle of reciprocity facilitated the equitable distribution of shortterm sacrifices. Thus, the very structure of the GATT system ensured
mutually beneficial outcomes even in the absence of democratic inputs
or external monitoring. Furthermore, core principles of GATT such as
MFN, national treatment, and progressive tarification helped to
promote transparent outcomes even if the GATT process itself
92
remained shrouded in non-transparent dealings. Similarly, neutralizing
the grip of protectionist lobbies arguably served to facilitate democratic
93
choice within individual member states.
Even the seemingly antidemocratic mechanism of “fast track” legislation can be defended on
democratic grounds as a necessary safeguard against protectionist
94
meddling.
However, a succession of GATT rounds has already plucked most of
the low-hanging fruit among possible trade concessions. Liberalization
increasingly involves painful sacrifices for which trade concessions alone
sometimes prove inadequate to compensate. As tariff levels have come
down dramatically, attention has also shifted to non-tariff barriers.
Defensive measures to control such barriers often entail sanctioning
limited forays into regulatory harmonization. Furthermore, as trade
continues to integrate the global economy, demands for global
regulation have swollen. For all of these reasons, the WTO has
increasingly moved beyond GATT’s focus on “negative” trade
95
liberalization to encompass a more robust regulatory agenda.
This transition from negative to positive integration threatens to
undermine the natural balance and self-regulatory features of the
GATT process. So long as trade negotiations focused solely on
eliminating tariffs, such talks could be safely delegated to trade experts,
91. Petersmann, supra note 6, at 112; see Keohane & Nye, supra note 59, at 267–68.
92. McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 547–48. Mostfavored nation and national treatment function as non-discrimination rules, ensuring equal
treatment among members states. Tarification consists of converting quotas and covert
barriers into more a transparent form of trade barrier—tariffs—which can then be more
easily targeted by anti-protectionist lobbies. McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade
Constitution, supra note 5, at 548.
93. McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 356;
Petersmann, supra note 6, at 117.
94. McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade Constitution, supra note 5, at 542.
95. See generally Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 316–38 (providing multiple examples).
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primarily representing producer interests, whose reciprocal concessions
could be relied on to advance global welfare. With regulatory
harmonization on the table, the prospect of reduced global welfare and
covert protectionism becomes a real concern. Moreover, as the ambit of
global trade law expands to impinge on a broader array of policy
concerns, the set of constituent interests that must be accounted for is
96
no longer limited to those of trade ministries and manufacturers. The
democratic shortcomings of the WTO have, thus, become much more
97
objectionable.
To his credit, Guzman recognizes the need to reconfigure his
expanded WTO to address non-trade concerns.
However, his
solution—forming other specialized departments staffed by
98
technocrats—seems inadequate.
The same democratic objections
would remain applicable to policymaking by insiders whether drawn
99
from trade ministries or from any other branch of government.
Conversely, more ambitious “stakeholder” or “civil society” models for
institutional reform present their own democratic flaws, in that they
would likely privilege “Northern” (rich country) viewpoints over
100
“Southern” perspectives.
In any case, procedural reforms to ameliorate the problems of
democratic input and transparency can only go so far. Even if the WTO
were to take into account the full range of relevant perspectives, the
temptation for regulatory policy to be subverted to mercantilist ends
101
would remain of concern. The tangible, bottom line effects of trade
96. Regulatory harmonization can impact a broad gamut of domestic actors having
little or no direct connection to trade. Unlike tariff policies, which primarily affect input
prices, regulatory policies can affect the ability of ordinary citizens to engage in economic and
non-economic activities on many levels. Cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II:
Should Users Strike Back, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 21 (2004) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, TRIPS—
Round II] (describing how “the free traders who negotiated the GATT worked in an
environment in which the core concern, reducing market barriers, was viewed as producing . .
. unmitigated welfare gains [and thus] were not likely to appreciate the social importance, in
TRIPS, of balancing proprietary interests against public access needs”).
97. See Petersmann, supra note 6, at 117–18; McGinnis & Movsesian, World Trade
Constitution, supra note 5, at 564.
98. Guzman also tentatively raises the possibility of enabling amicus briefs to be
submitted in the WTO dispute resolution process, which could help broaden input into
judicial decisions, but would do nothing to widen the input into regulatory policymaking.
99. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
100. See Shaffer, supra note 77, at 62–74 (describing how the move to a “civil society”
model would privilege wealthy “Northern” non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that
have superior resources and organizational abilities as compared to their “Southern”
counterparts).
101. Cf. Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94
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policy may trump other regulatory concerns that have an importance
that is harder to quantify in monetary terms. Trade also commands the
attention of powerful business interests that (despite formal equality)
will likely retain readier access to policymakers rather than other lobby
groups. So long as the package deals negotiated under Guzman’s
“Mega Rounds” remained dominated by trade concerns (or are
perceived to), the tendency to view their contents through the lens of
102
trade interest would be hard to overcome. Regulatory bargains born
of strategic linkage could thus facilitate mercantilist aims and private
rent seeking to the global detriment.
III. EVALUATING TRIPS: A TEST CASE FOR LINKAGE
Given their apprehensions about regulatory bargaining, it comes as
no surprise that McGinnis and Movsesian have opposed Guzman’s
proposal for expanding linkage.
Interestingly, however, McGinnis and Movsesian do not appear to
regard TRIPs as an example of the sort of regulatory abuses of which
they warn. They suggest that the “danger of amoral wealth transfers is
different with respect to intellectual property than with respect to other
103
substantive regulation.” However, a plausible case can be made that
TRIPs, in fact, exemplifies the subversion of international lawmaking
that McGinnis and Movsesian predict generally. There is certainly
ample reason for concern that the regulatory bargain struck in TRIPs
was less than optimal. Moreover, the negative fallout from TRIPs
arguably extends beyond the confines of the Agreement itself. To the
extent that these concerns are valid, TRIPs may not be the model of
successful linkage that Guzman assumes, but rather the contrary.
Much ink has been spilled elsewhere debating the pros and cons of
TRIPs. Although most would agree that—at least in the short-term—
TRIPs largely inures to the benefit of the developed world at the
104
expense of developing nations, there is no consensus as to whether

AM. J. INT’L L. 478, 479 (2000) (“No matter how adroitly these two sets of norms are
reconciled in theory . . . forcing the square peg of competition policy into the round hole of
trade policy will change the shape of the peg.”).
102. Cf. Leebron, supra note 8, at 25–26 (“Linking disparate issues into a single regime
also poses the risk that the policy goals of one of the issue areas will predominate, so that the
goals of one are effectively sacrificed to the other. This is a particular danger where . . . the
institutional structure or bureaucratic players favor one set of policy goals over another.”
(footnotes omitted)).
103. McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 359.
104. See Yu, supra note 2, at 379–386. But see Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of
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Northern gains outweigh Southern losses. In other words, whether the
world as a whole has emerged better off as a result of the regulatory
105
The
harmonization of IPR that TRIPs imposes remains unclear.
relevant calculus goes well beyond balances of trade. Intellectual
property rights affect a broad range of domestic actors who may have
nothing to do with global commerce. Economists struggle as it is to
model the optimal level of intellectual property protection within the
106
confines of a single domestic system. Performing such an assessment
in the international sphere across a diversity of national systems with
differing patterns of economic activity, development, and technological
107
advancement perhaps amounts to a fool’s errand.
Therefore, any
conclusions on this score must be regarded as tentative and contingent.
That being said, there are two different issues that must be addressed:
First, is some harmonization of IPR better than no harmonization? And
second, if so, did TRIPs arrive at the right level of harmonization? In
other words, does TRIPs put in place a level of IP protection that
108
ensures an optimal balance between innovation and monopoly power?
On the first question, the answer appears to be a definite “maybe.”
On their face, IPR constitute monopoly barriers in restraint of trade.
They also restrict access to technology and inhibit the free flow of
information. Somewhat paradoxically, however, a plausible case to be
made is that all of these problems were worse in the pre-TRIPs world of
inadequate IP protection. The lack of effective IPR enforcement in
many countries deterred both IP exports and foreign investment,
inhibiting global integration and the dissemination of technology. To
the extent that one regards globalization as a good thing, harmonization
of IPR may be credited with overcoming obstacles that stood in its way.
Intellectual property rights also serve to promote innovation, a
public good that benefits the world as a whole. Preventing free riders
from engaging in sterile copying of IP resources may be necessary to
Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166 (1994) (arguing that TRIPs was in the
developing world’s economic self-interest).
105. It is also necessary to distinguish between short-term and long-term costs and
benefits to provide a full accounting. The discussion that follows represents a simplified
version of the underlying economics.
106. See MASKUS, supra note 23, at 28–33.
107. See id. at 33–35; Correa, supra note 48, at 209 (“The available evidence clearly
suggests that the role of IPRs vary significantly in accordance with productive structures and
levels of development.”).
108. A third issue one could raise is whether TRIPs belongs in the WTO. However,
this invites a more general debate on the institutional competence and regulatory governance
that lies beyond the focus of this Article.
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preserve optimal incentives for further investments in innovation.
Variants on this argument focus on forms of innovation of special
relevance to the developing world. Permitting IP producers protected
access to enable them to profit from their innovations in developing
markets provides an incentive for them to develop and to disseminate
109
technologies tailored to the specific needs of those nations.
Harmonized IPR may also encourage technology transfers and foster
indigenous innovation in the developing world, which could help reduce
the current imbalance in IP production.
Against this, one could argue that IPR are just one factor influencing
trade and foreign investment decisions, and that nations should be free
to choose their own mix of regulatory responses to balance globalization
110
and innovation against other priorities. Indeed, there may be a benefit
to regulatory competition between nations in helping to promote more
efficient tradeoffs in policymaking. Moreover, without adequate access
to off-shore technologies, developing nations may arguably end up
falling further behind the technological rat race. Existing IPR models
offer insufficient assurance that such access will occur on affordable
111
terms. The ability to appropriate IP goods directly, whether through
compulsory licenses or unsanctioned copying, may outweigh the
marginal benefits that developing nations stand to gain from IP
harmonization.
Moreover, regardless of the economic merits, the political reality
going into TRIPs was that most developing countries remained deeply
112
unconvinced of the value of Western IPR. Foisting a full-fledged IP

109. Anti-malarial medications are often cited as an example of a product need that
Western pharmaceutical companies have ignored because of a lack of market incentives.
Some have argued that this market failure arises from the absence of effective patent
protection for pharmaceuticals in nations suffering from malaria; thus, the implementation of
TRIPs may alleviate the problem. See MASKUS, supra note 23, at 156. However, patent
rights are not enough to create a market: there must also be the means to pay for
medications in sufficient quantity to offset development costs.
110. Cf. Correa, supra note 48, at 209 (arguing that “in the area of intellectual property
‘one size does not fit all’”).
111. In theory, since IPRs are territorial rights, IP producers should be able to engage
in price discrimination to sell their products to developing world customers at affordable rates
without undercutting their rich world markets. Yet, market imperfections stemming from a
fear of reimportation, inadequate returns sufficient to offset the costs of overseas marketing,
or simple inertia may stand in the way. Accordingly, some form of compulsory licenses may
be necessary to bridge the gap. See Netanel, supra note 63, at 322–28.
112. See Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the Intellectual Property Protection
Debate: Are the North and South Arguing Past Each Other When We Say “Property”? A
Lockean, Confucian, and Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307 (1996). To

PAGER - FORMATTED

2006]

3/3/2006 12:51:11 PM

TRIPS: A LINK TOO FAR?

241

regime upon them in exchange for unrelated trade concessions creates a
kind of regulatory non-sequitur: Such countries become responsible for
enforcing a set of regulatory norms that have no intrinsic raison d’être
113
114
except as a quid pro quo. IP protection is not cheap. Establishing a
functioning patent system, in particular, requires a specialized, technical
115
staff. Southern resentment of such burdens as Northern impositions
(however, fairly compensated in the bigger scheme) is unavoidable and
may lead to broader perceptions of illegitimacy directed against the
WTO. The lack of any organic commitment to enforcing such norms
can set up a dynamic of either systemic transgressions and hence future
116
trade friction, as has been the case with China or, perversely, over-

the extent IPR existed in Southern legal regimes pre-TRIPs, they often sprang from radically
different premises. See, e.g., Gerard Bodeker, Traditional Medical Knowledge, Intellectual
Property Rights & Benefit Sharing, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 785, 786–87 (2003)
(describing protection of folklore and traditional knowledge enacted under auspices of the
African Intellectual Property Organization).
113. One can imagine, for example, a court in a hypothetical Central American country
being presented with a novel question of patent law under that nation’s freshly minted patent
statute. Obliged to inquire into the underlying purpose of the patent system to resolve an
ambiguity, the court is told that the purpose of protecting patents is to ensure access to
Yankee markets for the local banana industry. Where does one go from there?
114. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 147 (2002) [hereinafter DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE,
INFORMATION FEUDALISM] (“Developing nations would have to find tens of millions of
dollars to set up the infrastructure of intellectual property protection . . . that would largely
service the needs of foreign rights holders.”). Some of this expenditure can be recouped
through user fees, but only at the risk of making the acquisition of IPR prohibitively
expensive for anyone other than rich multinational companies (i.e., effectively denying local
actors access to IP protection in their country—discriminatory pricing by nationality being
prohibited under TRIPS).
115. One could, of course, piggyback on the patent prosecution efforts of other
nations, on the assumption that most applicants will also have sought patents elsewhere.
However, such attempts to function on the cheap invite abuses by applicants and raises the
potential of over-enforcement. See James Love, Access to Medicine and Compliance with the
WTO TRIPS Accord: Models for State Practice in Developing Countries, in GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 77 (Peter
Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2d ed. 2002).
116. From a Northern standpoint, China represents the most glaring example of a
“rogue nation” perceived to systematically flout IPR. Yet, such transgressions are entirely
predictable. The absence of any indigenous tradition of intellectual property (and indeed a
cultural tradition that values copying) arguably renders the whole project illegitimate in the
eyes of the Chinese public. See generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN
ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995)
(describing intellectual tradition in China based on reverence for and imitation of ancient
“classics”). Even assuming complete good faith on the part of the Chinese government,
systemic under-enforcement of IPR in China could thus be expected.
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enforcement due to unfamiliarity with permissible exceptions and/or
118
capture by multinationals of the new-fledged IPR regimes; all of which
can fuel further indigenous resentment. So long as IPR remain an alien
graft upon the body of indigenous law, the prospect of their successful
119
implementation, thus, remains problematic.
On the other hand, IP harmonization cannot be viewed in isolation.
By the time the Uruguay Round began, the open appropriation of IP
goods and, in particular, blatant forms of piracy and counterfeiting had
grown into a major irritant to global trade. The United States’ response
of unilateral “Special 301” sanctions in retaliation for such IP “theft”
120
had engendered further bad will.
A multilateral agreement offered
the advantage of disciplining these interventions and defusing future
121
conflicts.
Yet, WIPO had proven incapable of reaching a consensus
on a baseline IPR agreement. Meanwhile, agricultural and textile
protection of rich world markets had stubbornly resisted prior trade
liberalization efforts. It was unclear if the South had enough bargaining
clout in purely trade terms to overcome that resistance. Whatever the
merits of IP harmonization on its own, one could argue that TRIPs filled
a necessary function in the political economy of global trade
negotiations without which the WTO itself might not have been
achieved. On this view, a case can be made that IP harmonization was
imperative on political grounds and that the South had just as much to
gain from linkage as the North.
Assuming this was so, it brings us to the second question: Did
TRIPs get the level right? Too much IP protection can deter
innovation, obstruct the free flow of information, and lead to other

117. See Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 96, at 25 (noting that TRIPs does not
catalog permissible user rights retained under its general rubric, thereby raising the risk that a
literal incorporation of its prescriptions regarding IPR without mention of such exceptions
would lead to a higher level of protection than that in the United States).
118. See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 114, at
204–05.
119. See RICHARDS, supra note 79, at 9 (noting problems with interpretation and
applications of externally imposed IPR); Netanel, supra note 63, at 274 (describing problems
with “legal transplants”). H.L.A. Hart’s account of primary norms (i.e., acceptance of the
idea of intellectual property) serving as a prerequisite before secondary norms (i.e., the terms
of a particular IPR regime) can have any meaning seems apposite. HART, supra note 81, at
79–124. I am grateful to Adam Mosoff for this point.
120. See MASKUS, supra note 23, at 1.
121. See Adronico Oduogo Adede, Origins and History of the TRIPS Negotiation, in
TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND
SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 30, at 23, 31; cf. Leebron, supra note 8, at 26 (noting that
“linkage will often be preferred to unilateralism”).
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122

inefficiencies associated with monopoly power.
Too little protection
would also detract from innovation and perpetuate the imbalances that
preceded TRIPs (albeit in reduced form) to the extent that developed
nations continued to exceed the floor of IPR minima that the
123
Agreement established. Again, a definitive assessment of optimal IPR
levels defies current economic capabilities. Nonetheless, a number of
circumstantial elements suggest that TRIPs erred on the high side; that
is, it set mandatory minimum levels of IPR that conferred more power
to IP producers than might have been warranted.
First, the fact that TRIPs amounts to an upward harmonization,
imposing essentially rich world IP standards on developing nations,
appears problematic. A number of commentators have argued that IP
standards in developed nations, especially in the United States, have
become inflated in recent years, reaching excessive levels of
124
protection. Therefore, these standards are already suspect in the eyes
125
of many.
Even if such standards were appropriate for rich countries,
expanding IPR to include developing nations would, on its face, seems
to warrant a reduced level of protection overall. Broadening the market
protected by IPR makes an expanded source of rents available to IP
producers. In the absence of increased competition, this would reduce
the time required to ensure an adequate return on their investments.

122. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 63, at 222 (noting that “copyright may sometimes
impede democratization unless substantial limits are place on copyright holder rights”).
123. Referring to an overall “level” of IP protection amounts to an oversimplification.
Not only must IPR be separated into the different regimes, copyright, patent, trademarks,
etc., but also the cluster of rights and exceptions both as to the scope and the duration of
protection granted in each individual regime represents individual variables in which its
various permutations must be considered separately to model the effects of a particular IP
regime.
124. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242–67 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the extension of the copyright term as exceeding any plausible incentive-based
limit); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (questioning the need for property rights in a cyber-connected
society); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 263, 274 (2000) (questioning the value of
business method patents and critiquing the general trend in IP law toward excessive
protection without any underlying rationale); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and
the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999) (critiquing excessive propertization
of trademark law); William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting
the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907 (1997).
125. See MASKUS, supra note 23, at 65–66 (arguing that the U.S. intellectual property
“regime has become overly protectionist by almost any utilitarian standard,” and that “it
seems unwise to advocate the exportation of such protection to developing nations”).
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Because IP producers are overwhelmingly concentrated in rich
countries, such competition is unlikely to arise. Instead, bringing
developing nations into a global IP regime gives IP producers access to
essentially captive markets. Therefore, at least for products developed
for a worldwide market, an equivalent incentive to innovate could be
126
obtained at reduced levels of IP protection.
Notwithstanding the overall logic of lower protection, IP producer
nations have a vested interest in moving standards upward. Because IP
exports externalize the losses from deadweight monopolies to
purchasers abroad while internalizing the benefits as a positive balance
of trade, producer nations might rationally pursue higher levels of
protection in a global IP regime than they would otherwise opt for in a
127
purely domestic system. Under such conditions, IP importers (for the
most part in the South) would end up subsidizing the added costs of
such supra-optimal protection.
Assuming arguendo that TRIPs represents such a supra-optimal
outcome, the fact that developing nations received offsetting
compensation in the form of agricultural and textile concessions hardly
rectifies this fundamental imbalance. Trade concessions, even if
unilateral, generally benefit both the recipient and the grantor alike
128
because trade protection is fundamentally inefficient.
By contrast,
excessive IP protection can hurt all sides. Developing nations, as IP
importers, emerge the most visibly disadvantaged, because they are
forced to pay higher rents for longer periods. To the extent that
Southern nations have traded away access to technology for textile and
agricultural markets, the long-term implications of this bargain are
particularly troubling.
As Rochelle Dreyfuss has pointed out,
technology is a cumulative enterprise and the developing world risks
falling further and further behind, stuck in a neo-colonial trap as
129
producers of primary goods and basic commodities.
126. For products specifically targeting the needs developing nations, the opposite
might apply. Because poorer nations may pay lower rents, higher levels of protection might
be needed to ensure an adequate return. Nonetheless, this special case hardly undermines
the economic logic of reduced protection. Instead, the problem can be tackled through sui
generis solutions. An example of the latter would be recent proposals in the United States to
offer extended patent protection on existing drugs as an incentive for pharmaceutical
companies to invest in risky and potentially unprofitable safeguards against bioterrorism. See
Marc Kaufman, Bioterrorism Response Hampered by Problem of Profit, WASH. POST, Aug. 7,
2005, at A5 (describing proposal for “wildcard patents”).
127. Guzman, supra note 27, at 316.
128. See Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra note 7, at 62 n.1.
129. Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 96, at 28–30 (condemning TRIPs as
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Even rich countries may emerge worse off overall if protection levels
rise too far. Not all monopoly deadweight losses can be externalized;
some remain the burden of domestic consumers and others may be reinternalized to the extent that the costs of IPR enforcement in
130
developing nations hurt collateral U.S. interests.
Moreover, as
existing IP holders gain undue leverage to stifle secondary
131
inventors/creators, this will hinder innovation rather than foster it.
To explain why rich country negotiators would pursue IP standards
antithetical to their own national interests, one must consider the
political economy underlying such negotiations. TRIPs did not emerge
on the Uruguay Round agenda out of an abstract concern over fostering
132
global innovation.
Rather, TRIPs was negotiated at the behest of
powerful IP producer interests, primarily in the United States, Europe
133
and Japan. These industries mobilized concerted lobbying efforts to
134
propose specific provisions that advanced their corporate interests.
Naturally, such lobbying favored stronger protection designed to
135
maximize monopoly rents tied directly to their own bottom lines.
While producer lobbies have traditionally enjoyed privileged access

resting on an “unconscionable bargain” that condemns developing countries to a future of
industrial obsolescence).
130. An example of such potential re-internalization of costs could have arisen in the
recent AIDS pharmaceutical showdown had the hardline stance of Big Pharma prevailed and
an entire continent succumbed to the pandemic. The long-term costs of the socio-economic
disruption and political instability that would have resulted could easily have outweighed the
value of the patent rights being contested. See Francis Mangeni, Implementing the TRIPS
Agreement in Africa, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON
TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 30, at 219, 230 (“Impoverishing and
leaving destitute entire populations in developing countries is economic suicide for developed
countries and industry lobbies.”).
131. See Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 96, at 22.
132. See Petersmann, supra note 6, at 120–22 (arguing that TRIPs was not based on any
serious cost-benefit analysis of global welfare effects but was rather a political deal brokered
on behalf of IP producers).
133. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, BUSINESS REGULATION, supra note 3, at 63. The
strongest proponents of globalized IPR were centered in the software, content (film and
music), and pharmaceutical industries. One commentator goes so far as to claim that “[i]n
effect, twelve corporations made public law for the world.” SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE POWER,
PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 96 (2003); see
also Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and the New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 19 (2004).
134. See Yu, supra note 2, at 405–06 (citing SELL, supra note 133, at 8).
135. Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO, 77 INT’L AFFAIRS 15,
26 (2001) (describing TRIPs as “turn[ing] the WTO into a royalty-collection agency” for the
benefit of IP producers).
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to trade negotiators, WTO negotiations are difficult for consumer
advocates and other non-producer interests to monitor, let alone
influence. Meanwhile, opposition from developing nations could simply
be “bought off” by trade concessions.
In the absence of a
counterbalancing impetus to safeguard the public domain or legislate in
favor of user rights, the provisions of TRIPs focused primarily on
137
defining the rights of IP owners, rather than on their limitations.
That TRIPs was negotiated in the context of a global trade
agreement (as opposed to a stand-alone treaty on intellectual property)
may have also encouraged mercantilist biases of negotiators to supplant
138
Given the powerful
a broader reckoning of national interest.
comparative advantage rich countries enjoy in IP, harmonization
promised to unlock new export markets and to ensure a more favorable
balance of trade. Such concrete, short-term objectives could be
expected to eclipse more nebulous, fundamentally unquantifiable
139
concerns over optimizing innovation.
Furthermore, IP treaties (of which TRIPs is no exception) typically
act as a one-way ratchet, whereby a minimum floor of IPR becomes
140
entrenched without any corresponding ceiling.
There is, thus, a
natural tendency for standards to creep upwards over time as rich
country negotiators agree to match each other’s highest levels. While
regulatory harmonization is often justified as preventing a “race to the
bottom,” the dynamics of international harmonization risk the opposite
danger, namely a “race to the top.” IP harmonization may, thus, offer a
means for IP producers to enact an end-run around domestic
opposition, using international treaties to achieve a level of protection
they could not attain by domestic means. Indeed, the mere prospect of

136. Shaffer, supra note 77, at 52–54; Tarullo, supra note 101, at 488.
137. Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 96, at 25–28; BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS,
BUSINESS REGULATION, supra note 3, at 139.
138. See Reichman, supra note 48, at 456 (“[T]he big multinational firms with greatest
access to USTR keep on pressing for ever higher levels of intellectual property protection,
regardless of the costs, and few have bothered to ask the small and medium-sized firms that
actually drive the U.S. economy whether they would benefit or suffer from such proposals.”).
139. See Netanel, supra note 63, at 218–20 (describing how TRIPs epitomized “a
dramatic move to reconceptualize” intellectual property as a trade issue, “riding roughshod
over venerable copyright values and the public interest in the process”); cf. Leebron, supra
note 8, at 26 (describing how linkage can lead to issue biases). Such myopic tendencies in
policymaking are consistent with studies in psychology that demonstrate that people assign an
undue salience to concrete, immediate events that outweigh more important, but distant
goals.
140. See Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 96, at 22.
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international harmonization has been used to justify increased domestic
141
protection. As a result, IP agreements have led to higher IP standards,
142
even in rich countries. Yet, once entrenched, these higher standards
are difficult to revise downward, even when conditions might otherwise
justify pulling back. Over time, one can expect IPR standards to
143
continue to migrate toward supra-optimal levels.
Therefore, international harmonization of IPR would appear to raise
the sort of public choice hazards of which McGinnis and Movsesian
warn. A mercantilist focus may distort a broader weighing of national
interest. Producer lobbies can unite around their shared interest in
144
regulatory protectionism, while the opposing forces are weak and
fragmented, with domestic opposition unable to mobilize effectively at
the international level and international resistance easily overcome by
logrolling. Finally, regulatory “lock-in” ensures that standards follow a
one-way ratchet upward towards greater protectionism, leaving no
discretion to revise standards downward to meet changing needs. In
theory, such regulatory flaws could manifest even in the absence of a
direct link to trade. However, without linkage, IP harmonization would
never have gotten off the ground.
Other features specific to the negotiating history of TRIPs reinforce
the suspicion that the Agreement may have been the product of a
flawed regulatory process. Although the United States had long sought
to make IPR part of global trade negotiations and adopted unilateral
145
measures designed to force the issue, the original Uruguay Round
141. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205–08 (2003) (finding that the United States
needs to “play a leadership role” in setting international copyright standards); H.R. 374,
104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995) (same for trademark law).
142. There is some tendency to harmonize upwards toward the highest common
denominator. Even without an actual agreement, domestic IP lobbies can promote higher
standards pour encourages les autres (i.e., to set a good example). See 537 U.S. at 198, 205–08.
143. The optimal level of IP protection varies as technological and industrial factors
evolve. Ideally, the precise mix of rights, exceptions, and limitations in an IP regime should
be adjusted over time to maintain a dynamic equilibrium between incentives and monopoly
losses. Because international treaties permit only upward variations and then lock in the
higher standards through subsequent agreements, the ability of domestic regulators to
maintain an optimal balance would be gradually foreclosed. See Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II,
supra note 96, at 22.
144. The software industry has recently had something of a change of heart regarding
IP protection, at least within the United States, with several leading companies expressing
concerns that software and business methods patents have gotten out of hand. However,
most software firms continue to support expanded IPR abroad.
145. Efforts to legislate IPR into GATT dated back to Tokyo Round when anticopying provisions had been proposed and rejected. In 1988, the U.S. Congress designated
inadequate IP protection as a form of “unfair trade” subject to unilateral retaliation under
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146

agenda set out a rather modest IP agenda for discussion. Instead, the
ambitions of IP proponents appear to have expanded as the Round
progressed. An initial focus on preventing trading of counterfeit goods
evolved into proposals for a full-blown IPR regime with detailed
standards governing all of the major categories of intellectual
147
Moreover, while the original agenda contemplated both
property.
creating limits to IPR as well as establishing a floor of a minimum
protection, the end product contained only the latter. Rich countries
dominated the drafting of the final agreement and were able to shape it
148
to their interests.
Furthermore, the linkage attached to TRIPs was not limited to
agricultural and textile concessions. As the Uruguay Round advanced,
the United States made it clear that the entire package of agreements
being negotiated in the Round hinged on the United States achieving its
IPR goals and threatened to unilaterally retaliate against individual
149
hold-outs.
Accordingly, some commentators have argued that there
was a coercive element to the TRIPs negotiations in which developing
150
nations were bullied into a deal against their better judgment.
Finally, it is worth recalling that the Uruguay Round represented a
quantum leap in global trade law. TRIPs represented only one of
several landmark agreements ultimately adopted, not the least of which
151
was the establishment of the WTO itself.
Many trade delegations,
particularly those from developing nations with limited resources, may
section 301 of the 1971 Unfair Trading Act (section 301). See RICHARDS, supra note 79, at
125.
146. See World Trade Organization, Punta del Este Declaration, Draft Ministerial
Declaration of 20 September 1986, at 7–8, WT/MIN(86)/W/19 (establishing as an agenda item
for Uruguay Round the “aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new
rules . . . to develop a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with
international trade in counterfeit goods”); see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 11 (2d ed. 2003); Adede, supra note 121,
at 25 (arguing that the “inclusion of TRIPS on the agenda was a last-minute political
compromise [which] ‘featured almost as a footnote on a crowded agenda . . . and it was
uncertain whether that contentious item would survive the end of the round’”).
147. GERVAIS, supra note 146, at 10–26 (recounting the history of TRIPs
negotiations).
148. See Peter Drahos, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and
Dialogue, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 115, at 167–69.
149. See id. at 169–70; see also id. at 178 (noting that the European Union also applied
its own unilateral pressure).
150. See Drahos, supra note 148, at 169–172; Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note
96, at 29; Yu, supra note 2, at 373–75 (describing “coercion” narrative).
151. For a partial list, see supra note 3.
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have been unable to keep track of the evolving provisions of TRIPs.
In addition, because of the pressure to conclude an IP agreement,
troublesome issues were resolved through compromises that relied on
153
ambiguous language to finesse substantive disagreements. Most of the
ambiguities concern exceptions to IPR; the rights themselves are clearly
defined. Some commentators have argued that TRIPs amounted to
154
something of a swindle foisted by the North on an unsuspecting South.
Such accusations of bad faith have intensified as rich nations have failed
to make good on their promises of offsetting agricultural and textile
155
liberalization.
In any case, such ambiguities represent unfinished arguments that
continue to fester as a source of acrimony. IP producers stand accused
156
of twisting TRIPs’ language to achieve an in terrorem effect.
More
generally, the disagreements reflect a fundamental gulf in conceptions
of IPR whereby one man’s piracy is another’s intellectual commons.
The AIDS pharmaceutical debacle provides a vivid example of the
heated rhetoric such conflicting perspectives can generate. Where Big
Pharma saw the wholesale appropriation of their property, others saw a
157
necessary humanitarian response to a global health crisis.
All of these reasons underscore the concern that, far from being an
unqualified success, the use of linkage to bring TRIPs into the WTO
resulted in a flawed regulatory bargain that might have done more harm
than good. Forcing an issue into the WTO on which its membership had
not yet achieved anything close to consensus might ultimately have been
158
counterproductive.
Admittedly, it is difficult—and perhaps
premature—to judge. Some of the criticisms of TRIPs overstate the
case. TRIPs was essentially completed in final form at least one year

152. See Yu, supra note 2, at 375–76 (describing “ignorance” narrative); see also
Shaffer, supra note 77, at 44–45 (noting that many smaller developing nations cannot afford
more than a skeletal staff—sometimes only a single diplomat—to represent them in the
WTO).
153. DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra note 114, at 139.
154. See Yu, supra note 2, at 375–76 (describing “ignorance” narrative).
155. See id.
156. See Reichman, supra note 48, at 452–54 (describing “pound of flesh mentality”).
157. The AIDS pharmaceutical dispute focused on ambiguities such as the provision in
TRIPs governing the use of compulsory licenses, with disagreement as to the scope of
“emergency” exception and the measures authorized thereunder. See TRIPs Agreement,
supra note 1, art. 30.
158. Cf. Leebron, supra note 8, at 26 (stating that “it seems inappropriate to use
linkage to create pressure to reach an agreement on a subject on which few believe there
should a multilateral agreement at all”).
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before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round; thus, it is difficult to argue
that developing nations were railroaded into an eleventh-hour
settlement. Moreover, no agreement is perfect, and TRIPs does have
enough “wiggle room” to potentially avert some of the worse-case
159
scenarios.
Much will depend on the interpretations given to TRIPs’
more ambiguous provisions. The delayed implementation permitted for
developing nations also means that its economic and political
160
consequences remain largely unknown.
Moreover, far from being
solely a one-way ratchet, the understanding on compulsory licensing
adopted in the Doha Declaration and its sequel did affect something of
roll-back, at least measured against the most maximalist interpretations
161
of TRIPs.
Nonetheless, the perception remains in many circles that TRIPs
amounted to a one-sided deal forced down the throats of the developing
162
world through a combination of false promises and coercive pressure.
Such perceptions continue to poison negotiations over current IP
163
issues. Plans in the United States for a “TRIPs II” have been shelved
in the face of Southern intransigence. Instead, the United States and
the European Union have turned to bilateral agreements to implement
164
so-called “TRIPs+” provisions.
Developing nations have pursued
their own “regime-shifting” strategies to counterbalance TRIPs by
building favorable IP-related norms into other international
165
agreements. Non-governmental organizations have also been active in
fulminating against TRIPs. The AIDS pharmaceutical debacle gave
159. See Reichman, supra note 48, at 459.
160. Developing nations were granted a five-year delay before the obligations of
TRIPs came into force, while the least developed had a ten-year phase-in that only expired
this year. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 65, 66. Under the Doha Declaration, the
latter were granted an additional ten years before pharmaceutical patents had to be
protected. See Helfer, supra note 133, at 5.
161. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World
Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2005)
[hereinafter Abbott, Medicines Decision] (providing background to Doha Declaration and
account of negotiating positions).
162. If anything, these critical perspectives have increased and strengthened in
vehemence over time, as phase-in deadlines for implementation have begun to expire. See
Helfer, supra note 133, at 3, 24.
163. Cf. Leebron, supra note 8, at 26 (noting the risk that using linkage to bring in
parties hostile to a set of policy norms may undermine further development of such norms).
164. Pugatch, supra note 44, at 442–62 (providing empirical analysis of recent
agreements).
165. See Helfer, supra note 133, at 55–61 (describing resistance strategies used by
developing nations to generate counterregime norms in alternative fora that can be used to
oppose or mitigate the effects of TRIPs).
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them a golden opportunity to cast TRIPs as the ugly face of
globalization run amok. Attacks on “biopiracy” also serve to highlight
166
rhetorically the perceived one-sidedness of the IPR codified in TRIPs.
While opposition to IP harmonization was perhaps inevitable, such
antagonism has been fueled by sense of illegitimacy over the process by
which TRIPs came about and the narrow coterie of interests the
Agreement is seen to serve.
Moreover, the bad will accumulated over IP issues has spilled over
into negotiations on other trade issues. Commentators have linked the
stalemate in recent trade negotiations, in part, to lingering resentment
167
and distrust over TRIPs.
While Northern interest groups have seen
TRIPs as pioneering an effective form of linkage that has inspired a
168
myriad other “trade and” causes to attempt to copy its playbook,
Southern negotiators have adamantly refused to budge on any of them.
These conflicting views of linkage contributed to the breakdown of both
169
the Seattle and Cancún trade talks.
The WTO may, thus, be the
victim of unrealistic expectations and cumulative distrust—both too
little linkage as well as too much. While the factors driving these
phenomena go well beyond IPR and TRIPs, at least some degree of
culpability may be placed at their doorstep.
Granted, some of the bad will associated with TRIPs has to do with
170
unfilled promises, as opposed to the contents of the Agreement per se.
Similarly, the heated protests engendered by the AIDS pharmaceutical
crisis arguably had more to do with maximalist positions adopted by Big

166. “Biopiracy” is used as a pejorative to describe the exploitative acts of Western
“bioprospectors” who convert natural resources found in developing nations—often
identified by drawing on the traditional knowledge (TK) of indigenous peoples—into
valuable IP products without adequately compensating the indigenous communities from
which the resources were identified and/or taken. The term “biopiracy” provides a deliberate
echo of the “anti-piracy” rhetoric which Western proponents of TRIPs used to mobilize
support for their cause. By drawing such parallels between “Western” IP and TK,
proponents of TK protection seek to assimilate the issue into the larger IPR debate. See
Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 233, 237–38 (2001).
167. See, e.g., MASKUS, supra note 23, at 239–40.
168. Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra note 7, at 59.
169. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text; cf. Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra
note 7, at 59 (describing the “three legs” of the WTO mutating into an even more unwieldy
“centipede” whose forward progress grinds to a halt).
170. Developing nations are still awaiting the liberalization in the agricultural and
textile markets that they were promised in exchange for IPR. Technical assistance and
technology transfers called for under TRIPs are also seen as falling short of expectations. See
Yu, supra note 2, at 379–386.
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Pharma and its White House allies than the intrinsic one-sidedness of
171
Still, these later conflicts can be traced, in part, to the
TRIPs itself.
sub-optimal circumstances in which the TRIPs Agreement was
negotiated. The complex dynamics of the Uruguay Round arguably
fostered incomplete bargains and ambiguous drafting that set the stage
for confrontations down the road.
Such flawed compromises
encouraged actors on both sides to believe that they had gotten more
than was actually agreed to, thereby lending a sting of betrayal to the
172
inevitable confrontations.
Perhaps some version of TRIPs was inevitable and necessary to
advance global integration. But was there a better way to go about
negotiating that might have led to a more congenial outcome? Guzman
may be correct to argue that TRIPs could only have been achieved
through linkage.
However, this does not necessarily justify an
unqualified endorsement of such linkage strategies. Regardless of the
actual merits of TRIPs, the negative concerns and perceptions it has
generated should give one pause before calling for further emulation of
the formula that gave rise to it. Even if TRIPs is not as bad as some
173
claim, other regulatory agreements born of linkage may be worse.
The risk of linkage is not only that flawed agreements might result, but
174
also that a cumulative legacy of distrust and resentment will prevail.
The potential paralysis that proliferating linkage claims could induce
must be reckoned with as well.
Ultimately, some forms of regulatory linkage may be necessary to
continue the processes of economic liberalization and global integration
that the GATT pioneered.
However, left unregulated, linkage
strategies may do more harm than good. The general presumption
should be that linkages to advance regulatory harmonization are
175
disfavored. Without better assurances, such strategies arguably should
be discouraged. This begs the question of whether some form of formal
controls on linkage should be adopted, either substantive or procedural
in nature.

171. See Reichman, supra note 48, at 452–56.
172. Cf. id. at 460 (“The hard truth is that these same governments compromised far
more, and obtained far less, than the various trade associations can afford to admit.”).
173. There is no reason to think that TRIPs, coming as but the first in what might be a
long line of regulatory harmonization measures, has charted the farthest depths possible of
abusive linkage.
174. See Tarullo, supra note 101, at 494 (describing the “system costs” of linkage in
causing further “strain on the legitimacy and institutional integrity of the WTO itself”).
175. See Leebron, supra note 8, at 26.
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IV. CONTROLLING LINKAGE: SOME POSSIBLE APPROACHES
A. Just Say NO: A Total Ban on Linkage
Perhaps the simplest solution would be to abolish linkage strategies.
This approach is advocated by McGinnis and Movsesian who
disapprove of regulatory harmonization on principle and want the WTO
176
to return to its core focus on trade. They oppose linkage because it
177
lowers the transaction costs to (bad) regulatory bargains. As a result,
they appear to favor a total ban on any form of regulatory linkage
between trade and non-trade issues, whether procedural or
178
substantive.
Their approach has the benefit of clarity. However, McGinnis and
Movsesian proceed to make an exception for TRIPs, which they see as
179
sufficiently related to trade to justify inclusion in the WTO.
Yet, as
Jagdish Bhagwati has observed, if IPR qualify as “trade-related,” then
180
This points to a problem with the trade purist
almost anything can.
approach: however much one opposes linkages in general, the
temptation to make exceptions remains powerful. Indeed, now that
TRIPs has set a precedent, this temptation has become almost
irresistible. As a practical matter, few countries could be expected to
rule out future linkages entirely.
One might also question whether the WTO can continue its work of
trade liberalization without incorporating some degree of linkage for at
least three reasons. First, successive GATT rounds have already hit the
easy targets. The main trade sectors left to be liberalized—agriculture
in particular—require politically painful concessions that will not come
easily. In order to pry open Northern markets for primary goods,
developing nations need to have something to offer in exchange;
176. McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 365.
177. Others go even further in the case of TRIPs and appear to equate strategic linkage
with coercion, arguing that the “package deal” structure of the Uruguay Round meant that
developing nations were “coerced” into signing the parts they did not want to get the ones
they did. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
178. McGinnis & Movsesian, Against Global Governance, supra note 23, at 358.
179. Id. at 359.
180. See Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra note 7, at 58. An attempt to establish a
“substantial relation” to trade test would parallel the U.S. Supreme Court’s efforts to supply
a meaningful boundary to the Commerce Clause, a line that has proven notoriously difficult
to draw. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Violence
Against Women Act as beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause power); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the ban on guns in schools as beyond Congress’
Commerce Clause power).
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regulatory harmonization is one of the few cards with which they have
181
to play.
Second, as tariff levels have come down, the WTO has been forced
to police regulatory policy as an alternative source of covert
protectionism. The standard setting agreements negotiated as part of
182
the Uruguay package represent steps in this direction.
While such
purely “defensive” harmonization does not raise the same dangers as
the affirmative mandates imposed by TRIPs (and thus need not be
183
subjected to the procedural controls contemplated here),
not all
regulatory issues can be guided by the relatively objective standards that
these agreements rely on. More aggressive forms of harmonization may
be sought in other areas to preemptively foreclose the prospect of
184
unilateral protectionism.
Third, even without protectionist motives, more and more
regulatory issues have impacts on trade, and vice versa. Many argue
that the WTO’s very legitimacy depends on its ability to balance trade
185
against other policy concerns in an even-handed manner.
In this
respect, the case for linkage transcends individual programmatic goals.
As globalization advances in an increasingly interconnected world, the
need to negotiate comprehensive policy solutions makes linkage almost

181. Developing economies account for only a small share of total global gross
domestic product. However, they are disproportionately dependent on agriculture and other
primary goods. The unfortunate reality is that the marginal value these countries have as
export markets for rich countries may be dwarfed by the political clout wielded by domestic
farm lobbies. On the other hand, developing nations generally are “underregulated” by
comparison to their richer peers. Such regulatory laxities are often viewed as a form of unfair
trade or “social dumping” by the latter, that then seek to harmonize away the differences.
Thus, a North-South exchange of trade concessions for regulatory harmonization along the
lines of TRIPs may be the only way of extracting significant trade concessions from the
North. Whether such deals are a good thing from the standpoint of trade liberalization
depends, of course, on the nature of the harmonization.
182. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994); Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1144
(1994).
183. See Kalderimis, supra note 23, at 329–31 (distinguishing between “defensive” and
“progressive” harmonization).
184. See Cottier, supra note 21, at 221 (“[T]rade liberalization, at some point,
inherently starts to require, rely upon and develop positive integration, i.e., it depends on
common and shared standards.”).
185. See, e.g., id. at 221; Guzman, supra note 27, at 306–07.
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186

unavoidable.
If strategic linkage of regulatory issues cannot be excluded entirely,
could it be policed to control abuses? Ideally, one would want to devise
a mechanism to channel regulatory talks to the optimal level, confining
187
most to single-issue forums, while permitting a chosen few to advance
into multi-issue “Mega Rounds” of the sort Guzman envisions in cases
in which distributional skews block a policy outcome that everyone
agrees is in their long-term interest. In this way, the best of both worlds
could be obtained, because linkage would be restricted to issues in
which it is needed the most.
B. Mutual Gain As a Substantive Criterion
The difficulty comes in determining how such a channeling
mechanism might function. The most immediate focus needs to be on
restricting the agenda of future trade rounds in the WTO, because these
are the fora in which cross-issue logrolling can most readily occur. The
approach advocated by Jagdish Bhagwati would rely explicitly on the
criterion of “mutual gain” as the prerequisite for linkage: non-trade
issues could only be negotiated under WTO auspices to the extent that
188
they promise outcomes that would benefit all participants.
His
approach would, thus, bar agreements such as TRIPs that serve to bring
in issues with built-in distributional skews.
Ensuring mutual gain could prevent linkage from facilitating suboptimal outcomes. However, it is not obvious how such a requirement
could be enforced.
Proponents of TRIPs argued, however
tendentiously, that IPR would benefit developing nations by spurring
innovation and transfers of technology. Who is to say for sure that they
were wrong?
Mutual gain can be measured on many levels:
micro/macro or short-term/long-term. It might be unwise to rule out

186. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 59, at 270–72 (arguing that linkage is necessary to
address an “inherently connected” world).
187. Such forums need not be located within the WTO, as Guzman envisions with his
proposed departmental structure. Regulatory issues could continue to be dealt with in such
pre-existing international bodies as WIPO, the World Health Organization, UNESCO,
International Labour Organization, and the various environmental fora. Only where multiissue tradeoffs are required would the issue be transferred to the WTO for inclusion in a
trade round. Such a hybrid multi-institutional structure would have the advantage of
preserving the institutional capital and technical expertise of existing regimes (and to some
degree insulating them from the mercantilist pressures of the WTO), while providing the
option of referring certain proposals to the WTO both for bargaining purposes and, where
appropriate, for enforcement under the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanisms.
188. Bhagwati, After Seattle, supra note 7, at 57–59.
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potential agreements merely on the basis of distributional skews if there
were assurances that mutual benefits would accrue in the long run.
Indeed, even trade, Bhagwati’s paragon of mutual gain, can engender
short-term welfare losses as shifting markets force industrial
189
restructuring, as he himself acknowledges.
Yet, while the long-term
benefits of trade liberalization might qualify as axiomatic, the
consequences of other regulatory policies are much harder to forecast.
Establishing a methodology to identify the right sort of “mutual
gain” after netting all of the losses presents a daunting challenge, and
Bhagwati does not attempt this. Therefore, relying on mutual gain as a
substantive criterion to vet linkage claims appears somewhat
impractical. While certainly a desirable goal in principle, it offers
limited practical utility as a screening device.
V. A PROCEDURAL SOLUTION: PRE-COMMITMENT AS PREREQUISITE
A. Vetting by Process
A better approach would be procedural, rather than substantive.
The idea would be to build procedural “filters” into the agenda-setting
mechanism of a trade round to weed out flawed or one-sided regulatory
proposals. Several commentators have proposed “constitutional”
solutions along these lines, such as democratizing the WTO by opening
it to participation by civil society, promoting transparency, and
190
incorporating protections of fundamental rights. However, whatever
their intrinsic merits, such proposals face an uphill battle. Most member
states of the WTO remain firmly wedded to its current
intergovernmental mode of dealings and would be unwilling to
relinquish further sovereignty to an organization they could not fully
191
control.
Given such constraints, the best approach may be to work subconstitutionally within the political economy of member states alone.
The general idea would be to let the political “marketplace” of member
states decide which agreements offer sufficient promise of mutual
benefit to justify linkage. Just as the “invisible hand” of the market

189. Bhagwati, Symposium, supra note 46, at 127.
190. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 6, at 122–25.
191. The enormous fuss raised over filing amicus briefs in WTO dispute resolution
offers a glimpse of the determination of member states to defend their sovereign prerogatives
in this regard. See generally Georg C. Umbricht, An ‘Amicus Curiae Brief’ on Amicus Curiae
Briefs at the WTO, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 773 (2001) (summarizing debate).
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tabulates the collective preferences of private actors to generate a
wealth-maximizing solution, the collective decisions of WTO Members
arguably could provide a better indicator of mutual gain than any
“command and control” regime relying on substantive criteria to guide
192
its decisions.
The key is to get the process right. Just as markets function best
under rules that ensure an even playing field and equal access to
information, the process of lawmaking must be regulated to ensure
optimal decision-making.
Parliamentary procedures in domestic
legislatures commonly incorporate a variety of mechanisms to slow
down decision-making, improve deliberation, and promote internal
transparency. As noted earlier, international lawmaking not only lacks
these sort of procedural safeguards but also suffers from systemic
193
imperfections that raise additional dangers.
Therefore, the obvious
remedy is to build safeguards into the WTO process.
Peter Drahos has written of the need to create the conditions for
194
“democratic bargaining” over regulatory harmonization.
Drahos
focuses on the conduct of the actual negotiations. However, equal
195
attention should be paid to the process of setting the agenda.
Accordingly, in order to qualify for inclusion in a trade round, proposals
for regulatory harmonization of non-trade issues should be subject to
certain prerequisites designed to establish a shared “pre-commitment”
among a significant subset of WTO Members. Such pre-qualifying
procedures would be limited to proposals presenting the greatest danger
of regulatory abuse—namely, harmonization measures containing
affirmative regulatory mandates covering non-trade issues.
The
purpose of such procedures would be three-fold. First, they would
winnow the field of candidate issues, reducing the logistical complexities
of negotiating across multiple issues in a round and the opportunity for
tactical abuses thereby created. Second, they would both encourage and
enable a focused assessment and critique of each specific proposal,

192. See Drahos, supra note 148, at 162–64 (describing democracies as producing more
efficient regulatory outcomes than in communist societies and extending model to democratic
bargaining among sovereign states).
193. See supra notes 71–86 and accompanying text.
194. See Drahos, supra note 148, at 163–64 (describing conditions for democratic
bargaining between sovereign states); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The New Intellectual
Property Law System: New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 205 (2006).
195. Cf. MUELLER, supra note 64, at 92–94 (describing how agenda control permits
manipulation of ostensibly democratic outcomes).
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providing quality control that would serve as a confidence booster
196
Third, the pre-commitment
before any horse trading could begin.
required by this “vetting” process would help to legitimize the proposal
should it ultimately be adopted by demonstrating initial broad
consensual support.
Adopting a set of procedural rules along these lines need not require
any “constitutional” changes in the WTO. Member states could adopt
such rules as an operating convention akin to the internal parliamentary
197
rules set by each house of Congress. They would be implemented as
part of the conditions of a newly-launched trade round and could always
198
However, if they proved successful over
be revised by consensus.
time, a legitimacy norm that might acquire de facto constitutional force
199
could emerge.
B. In Praise of Committees
In domestic parliamentary contexts, there is a similar process of
vetting functions through a variety of mechanisms. The process begins
when a bill is introduced. The bill must be framed as a concrete
legislative proposal that could be enacted in its present form and is often
subject to scope limitations and labeling requirements. Proposed
legislation may then be referred to one or more committees for
consideration and approval before being offered for a floor vote.
Parliamentary procedures may also entail multiple “readings” of a bill
before it can advance. Finally, bicameralism and executive vetoes build
additional stages of review into the legislative process. These checks
and balances serve to temper the pitfalls of majoritarian power by
delaying impulse legislation, preventing legislative surprises, restricting
logrolling, and generally encouraging an orderly process. They also
provide pre-defined points of entry for external stakeholders to offer
input and attempt to influence decisions. Perhaps just as important,
196. The analogy might be to a mandatory veterinary exam before the horses are put
up for auction.
197. Cf. Ruud, supra note 64, at 451 (describing how the Constitution delegates to each
chamber of Congress the task of establishing its own internal rules of procedure).
198. Again, the analogy would be to the rules of Congress, which are left entirely to the
discretion of its Members. As has become recently apparent, even hallowed parliamentary
traditions as the Senate filibuster remain open to revision upon a simple majority vote. See
Brian McGuire, S.D. Senator Warns Democrats Against Obstruction Tactics, N.Y. SUN, Nov.
18, 2005, at 5.
199. An analogy here might be drawn to British “unwritten” constitutionalism, which,
in principle, remains subject to the paramount supremacy of Parliament, but as a practical
matter effectively constitutes a de facto set of binding norms.
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such requirements serve to enhance confidence in the legislative process
as a form of deliberative democracy that produces results that can be
200
accepted as legitimate.
A committee system offers perhaps the best opportunity for in-depth
vetting. Committees in U.S. legislatures comprise a subset of Members,
reflecting bipartisan balance, who are given continuing oversight over a
201
pre-defined set of issues. As such, they can acquire technical expertise
in these issues over time and assemble a specialized staff. Committees
hold hearings to gather testimony and review evidence on issues
relevant to proposed legislation and issue reports summarizing their
202
Their efforts help to build a consensus around legislative
findings.
203
proposals. Finally, in order to “report out” a bill, committee members
must vote in approval, bestowing their blessing of presumptive
legitimacy.
The committee review process thus serves many of the prequalifying functions identified above. It helps to winnow the field of
proposed legislation, conserving and prioritizing legislative resources. It
provides quality control by ensuring that the pros and cons of a given
bill are clearly identified and that obvious flaws have been vetted. And
finally, committee approval represents a degree of “pre-commitment”
by key legislators in that it tests the political support behind the
proposal.
Because committee procedures often enable minority
204
blocking tactics, committee approval may also signify a measure of
205
bipartisan support that confers additional legitimacy.
Note, however, that these pre-qualifying functions lose their

200. See generally POPKIN, supra note 69, at 152–53. Cf. Dean E. Murphy, Same Sex
Marriage Wins Vote In California, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A14 (describing criticism of
California Assembly legislators’ use of “gut and amend” tactics as subverting the normal
legislative process).
201. Committees are often further subdivided into subcommittees, thereby providing
yet another layer of review. For reasons of simplicity, these two levels will be collapsed into
one in the following discussion.
202. See generally Alan Rosenthal, The State of State Legislatures, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1185 (1983) (describing the “workhorse” role performed by committees).
203. See Common Cause of Penn. v. Commonwealth, 668 A.2d 190 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1995) (describing consensus-building function served by committees). A bill that has
undergone committee review, thus, acquires a degree of inherent legitimacy that the
measures enacted solely through majority floor votes may be perceived as lacking.
204. Such minority blocking is colloquially referred to “bottling up in committee.”
205. One might also regard the bicameral structure of the U.S. Congress as constituting
a second level of “committee” review. The Senate filibuster can also be seen as enforcing a
heightened “pre-commitment” by requiring a supermajority of Members to allow a vote to
proceed. See POPKIN, supra note 69, at 154–55 (describing the operation of a filibuster).
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meaning to the extent that subsequent amendments to the bill
206
Accordingly, many legislatures impose
materially alter its contents.
limits on floor amendments. For example, rules in the U.S. House of
Representatives require amendments to be “germane.” Many bills are
207
brought up under special rules precluding amendments entirely.
Could a committee system be grafted onto the WTO treaty process?
With 148 Members in the WTO, trade negotiations have grown
208
increasingly unwieldy. The WTO already relies on “working groups”
and “green room” processes to caucus and to negotiate on an
exploratory basis and has various standing committees and councils
209
charged with specific issues on a more permanent basis. Could linkage
proposals be formally delegated to some such group? In fact, a
committee system did function in GATT prior to 1991 to set the
agendas. The Consultative Group of Eighteen (CG-18) was made up of
key member states representing a broad spectrum of geopolitical
interests, which by some accounts was successful in building a consensus
210
around forthcoming trade initiatives.
Proposals to reconstitute it
211
occasionally surface.
A committee approach has also been used
successfully as a consensus-building mechanism in other international
212
contexts.

206. Cf. Murphy, supra note 200.
207. POPKIN, supra note 69, at 153–54.
208. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 59, at 270–72.
209. See generally WTO Charter, supra note 11, art. IV; Sylvia Ostry, World Trade
Organization:
Institutional Design for Better Governance, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 7,
at 361 (describing “green room” process in which informal caucusing occurs).
210. See id. at 368–69.
211. See id.; see also Gary Hufbauer, Part Five Summary to EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 7,
at 419, 423–24 (calling for the formalization of the green room system).
212. The “G-20” emerged as informal coordinating body comprised of foreign
ministers from a select grouping of global powers during the aftermath of the emerging
market financial crises in the late 1990s and proved a successful sounding board and
consensus builder for international economic policy, pulling together “the right countries” in
a careful balance between legitimacy (ensuring global representativeness) and effectiveness
(limiting membership to a manageable size). See Paul Martin, A Global Answer to Global
Problems, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2005) (calling for an expansion of this committee model to
tackle other international challenges). Jonathan Fried has suggested that this precedent
could serve as a model for WTO governance. See Jonathan T. Fried, General Summary to
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE
MILLENNIUM, supra note 7, at 428; see also Hufbauer, supra note 211, at 423–24 (citing
similar committee governance models from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank).
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However, at present, any proposal to delegate decision-making
authority over WTO business to a limited subset of Members is
213
probably politically untenable. The WTO membership has expanded
from its GATT origins as a relatively homogeneous club dominated by
214
Anglo-Europeans to become a much more diverse body.
Members
remain zealously protective of their sovereign rights and intensely
suspicious of any hint of insider dealings from which they might be
215
excluded.
Work within the WTO’s existing committee structures as
well as informal groupings on an ad hoc basis would be helpful in the
preparatory stages because these structures can consider various
regulatory options and help build a consensus around a specific
proposal. However, at least for the foreseeable future, formal agendasetting decisions would have to be undertaken at a higher level process
216
in which all Members could participate fully.
C. A Committee of the Whole
If a committee system is ruled out, perhaps an equivalent vetting
mechanism could be devised to serve as a “virtual committee.” One
answer would be to reconstitute the WTO membership as a “committee
of the whole” that would perform essentially the same pre-qualifying
functions. To do so, three main procedural requirements would need to
be respected. First, a reasonably specific and concrete regulatory
proposal needs to be placed on the table for consideration at the outset
of a trade round in a form that could be enacted into law. Second,
adequate opportunity to review the proposal and to suggest changes

213. As one seasoned trade diplomat observed, after Seattle, any revival of the CG-18
is a non-starter. See B.K. Zutshi, Comment, World Trade Organization: Institutional Design
for Better Governance, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 7, at 387, 389.
214. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 59, at 266–67, 270.
215. Id. at 269–70; Hormats, supra note 54, at 395.
216. Many smaller nations in the developing world lack the resources to participate in
the various working groups that the WTO fosters on an ongoing basis. Therefore, the
ultimate decision agenda setting should be reserved for either a Ministerial Conference or a
General Council meeting. Note that the other main procedural control devices of
parliamentary systems also appear inapposite. For example, multiple readings of proposed
legislation can be significant when majority voting applies, because the minority can work to
peel off individual votes to gain a blocking majority in a subsequent voting round. Under the
consensus rules of the WTO, however, multiple hearings are unlikely to arrive at a different
conclusion. Once a consensus exists, it means there is no active source of opposition to
organize a blocking effort. In addition, the strong, Member-centered ethos of the WTO
makes executive vetoes by, for example, the Secretary-General, a non-starter. Cf. Shaffer,
supra note 77, at 60–61.
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must be afforded to all Members. Third, after reviewing (and possibly
revising) the draft agreement, there would have to be a broadly shared
consensus among Members that, at least as to its regulatory merits, the
proposal makes enough sense that it deserves inclusion on the formal
217
agenda of the round.
The “pre-commitment” represented by this decision would not bind
any Member to approve the agreement as part of a package deal
ultimately adopted at the conclusion of the round. The only thing that it
would decide is what gets put on the agenda. At most, it would merely
signal a consensus among Members that the proposal, in theory,
represents a reasonably balanced, plausible regulatory policy solution to
218
a recognizable global problem.
Acceptance of the proposal would
remain contingent on further negotiations to offset any anticipated (or
perceived) inequalities in the economic and political burdens the
proposal would engender. During this process, concessions could be
exacted across other issues areas over the course of the round. Member
states would explicitly retain the option to reject the proposal later if
they felt they had not received sufficient compensation within the total
package deal. The winnowing and quality assurance functions of these
procedural requirements are perhaps self-explanatory and would
broadly parallel the workings of an actual committee. Formally, all
Members would be entitled and encouraged to study and comment on
the proposal. However, it would suffice in practice if a subset of
Members performed these functions. So long as the Members of any
such an “subcommittee” had sufficient expertise, credibility, and were
broadly representative of the relevant geopolitical interests, their
evaluations could be relied on by other Members in making the final
219
determination.
217. Pre-qualification would have to occur within a fixed time period following the
round’s launch. Proposals would, thus, have to be ready in a more-or-less final form at the
outset. Those proposals that missed the cutoff would have to await the next round or be
negotiated as stand-alone agreements. Because of this time pressure and because there might
be a number of competing proposals proffered by different nations that take varying
approaches on a given issue, the need for advance work to be delegated to a committee, as
suggested above, would probably be unavoidable. Here, the goal would be to arrive at a
consensus solution that might integrate elements from several different proposals, or at least
reduce the number of contenders.
218. This would not necessarily mean that all countries would consider the issue at
hand to be a “problem” from their individual standpoint, only that they recognize that a
substantial subset of Members do in good faith consider the matter as such for reasons
beyond pure mercantile advantage, and that the proposed solution constitutes a legitimate
component of cooperative global governance.
219. Such a “subcommittee” would likely constitute itself on an informal, de facto basis
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A decision to “pre-commit” following such vetting would serve as a
proxy for mutual benefit. By committing to a specific regulatory
proposal, WTO Members would bestow a presumptive legitimacy upon
it. Individual member states could always oppose the proposal later on
trade-related or fiscal grounds. However, it would be hard to denounce
the entire project as fundamentally iniquitous or coercive in the way
that TRIPs has come to be seen by some.
A key issue to resolve would be the precise requirements of the
“pre-commitment” process. The usual WTO practice is to operate by
220
consensus, which generally means an absence of active opposition. In
theory, any Member can block any decision. Arguably, however,
requiring a complete consensus in this conventional WTO sense would
be counterproductive in that it would set the bar too high. Just as only
four votes are required to grant a petition of certiorari in the Supreme
Court, versus five to decide a case, there is a functional logic in keeping
threshold requirements of admissibility lower than those demanded for
221
ultimate decision-making authority.
Demanding virtual unanimity
might encourage holdouts or lead to logrolling or deliberate recourse to
ambiguity that could effectively strip such a collective endorsement of
its meaning. This combination of logrolling and vagueness is precisely
the problem with the WTO’s current agenda-setting process. Formally,
all agenda items are adopted by consensus. However, because any
Member can block the entire agenda if its desired issue is excluded
entirely, agenda decisions are generally reached in a package deal. Such
logrolling blends the good with the bad in a bland stew of noncommittal generalities. Encouraging such practices would undermine
the impetus to vet regulatory proposals on an individual basis.
Instead, WTO Members might consider relying on some form of
voting to gauge support for regulatory proposals. To maximize the
legitimizing function of this process, a supermajority of Members should
be required to pass approval. The precise composition of this
supermajority would need to be carefully calibrated and perhaps require
some experimentation to obtain the optimal dynamics. It could be
defined through a combination of factors, subject to individual minima

within the committee as a whole based on Member interest. To be legitimate, however, any
Member that desired would be entitled to participate, and all Members would remain
apprised of discussions.
220. See WTO Charter, supra note 11, art. IX(1) n.1.
221. Lower threshold requirements encourage skeptics to keep an open mind and open
the door to negotiation across different viewpoints.
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and/or a weighted aggregate score. Factors considered could include
the number of nations in support of the proposal, the share of world
223
population they represent, their share of global trade, and—most
crucially—a requirement of geopolitical diversity. The latter condition
would force proposed agreements to be crafted in as balanced a fashion
as possible to appeal to diverse constituencies. Geopolitical fault lines
in the WTO vary by issue. They are often hemispheric in nature, but
not reliably so. Perhaps the simplest approximation of diversity would
224
therefore be to measure support on a continental basis. A significant
degree of endorsement by each continent would be a strong indicator of
mutual benefit.
Abandoning the WTO’s normal consensus procedures would
225
admittedly be controversial.
Member states would be reluctant to
surrender their blocking power, although a possible compromise would
be to permit countries that vote against the proposal to opt-out of the
226
regulatory scheme if it is ultimately approved.
Nonetheless, pre-

222. Cf. Van den Bossche & Alexovicova, supra note 36, at 675. A model for this kind
of composite weighting of voting factors can be found in the European Community’s
procedures for qualified majority voting under the Nice Treaty. The Nice Treaty requires the
support of two-thirds of European Community Members, which represent two-thirds of the
total E.U. population. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 205, Nov. 10, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 3; see also Martin, supra note 212, at 3 (describing economic and
demographic criteria that makes G-20 a representative body of world opinion).
223. Cf. Van den Bossche & Alexovicova, supra note 36, at 675–676. Such use of
functional criteria has a precedent in the Kyoto Agreement on Global Warming, which
required a minimum number of national signatories that collectively accounted for a predefined share of the total global emissions. Another example would be IMF voting, which is
weighted based on invested shares. See id. at 676.
224. Using continental divisions as a proxy for geopolitical representation has a long
pedigree in international law. The traditional rotation of the Secretary-Generalship of the
United Nations is perhaps the best example. NATO similarly splits its top jobs on a
continental basis between an American and an European.
225. Some would argue voting by supermajority would require amendment of the
WTO Charter. At present, Article IX of the WTO Charter governing “Decision-Making”
permits both consensual decisions and majority voting, although in practice the latter is rarely
done. Members could always agree in advance to be bound by the supermajority procedure
outlined here for purposes of regulatory agenda setting, with the resultant decisions to be
implemented by consensus or, if necessary, forced through by a majority vote. See WTO
Charter, supra note 11, art. IX; Van den Bossche & Alexovicova, supra note 36, at 676.
226. Such an opt-out provision would address the objection based on national
sovereignty that countries should never be bound by agreements to which they did not
consent (even though the issue here is only one of agenda setting). A similar opt-out is
contemplated under Article X procedures on amendment. See WTO Charter, supra note 11,
art. X(3). Permitting Members to opt-out of regulatory agreements would leave the
remainder to proceed on a plurilateral basis. It might also be worth considering a further
amendment of the WTO Charter to eliminate the current requirement of a complete
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qualifying regulatory proposals by supermajority vote could prove a real
improvement over the WTO’s current mode of business.
Another problem with current practice is that the resultant agendas
are far too malleable. The vague language in which they are drafted
provides ample room for reinterpretation and imposes little constraint
on the actual content of negotiations. Moreover, issue agendas can and
do evolve as trade rounds progress. The Uruguay Round was
particularly notorious for this reason. The very idea of the WTO was
only proposed midway through the Round. Such agenda changes
require consensus, but so does successful resolution of the round. The
agenda is but a starting point for the bargaining that follows
As a result, negotiations throughout a trade round follow a series of
moving targets.
Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.
Competing drafts may be circulated in multiple variations. Member
states are free to play bait and switch, inflating their demands as
opportunities for leverage present themselves in the free-for-all of
simultaneous negotiations. Compromises are brokered through various
227
insider deals reached in ad hoc meetings. Meanwhile, powerful actors
can manipulate the agenda to build a consensus around provisions they
228
favor, while marginalizing proposals from rivals.
Consequently, it
becomes hard for individual Members (not to mention interested
observers) to keep track of negotiations and to participate meaningfully
in shaping specific regulatory provisions. Moreover, as the prospect of a
package deal beckons, the temptation to lose track of complexities and
elide outstanding sticking points grows.
Again, such free-wheeling horse trades present less of a problem so
long as the net result is liberalization. However, with regulatory
harmonization on the table, such welfare-maximizing outcomes are no
longer ensured. The pre-qualifying procedures proposed here address
the special concerns raised by regulatory linkage by ensuring that a
specific, concrete proposal has been tabled and vetted for regulatory
balance prior to the start of the round.
Having a concrete proposal on the table would help to focus the
debate and permit subsequent bargaining to proceed from a known
starting point. The tradeoff would be that once a proposal is pre-

consensus to bring new plurilateral agreements into the WTO framework. See WTO Charter,
supra note 11, art. X(9).
227. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, BUSINESS REGULATION, supra note 3, at 83–84;
Drahos, supra note 148, at 167–69.
228. Cf. Helfer, supra note 133, at 21; Drahos, supra note 148, at 169.
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qualified, subsequent amendments would have to be strictly limited.
The initial proposal would define the regulatory scope that had been
“put in play,” and any amendments would have to be germane to the
issues encompassed.
Only incremental adjustments would be
countenanced, as opposed to wholesale revisions. Furthermore, there
would have to be an explicit consensus backing the amendment, which
would then supersede the original proposal as the focus of discussion.
In short, these procedures would introduce a measure of discipline
to WTO regulatory policymaking that would be analogous to the
parliamentary rules that govern legislative processes at the national
level. In both cases, the relevant norms would have to be policed by
consensus. While controversies might remain over boundary issues,
merely defining outer limits would be an improvement over current
practice.
D. TRIPs Revisited
How might TRIPs have come out had pre-qualifying procedures
been in place during the Uruguay Round? To engage such a
counterfactual invites speculation and risks the bias of hindsight. One
suspects, however, that the United States would have tendered a much
more modest proposal that was focused on achieving the original anticopying agenda set out at the start of the Round.
Such an agenda would likely have focused on literal copying and
emphasized copyright and trademark law rather than patents (or at least
have exempted least developed nations from its patent mandates).
Greater attention would have been placed on preventing global
shipments of counterfeited goods, while providing more leeway for
member states to vary protection levels domestically. In order to secure
a pre-commitment from developing nations, the agreement would have
had to have been more balanced in its content than TRIPs. This might
have entailed broader categories of permissible exemptions, more
229
concrete user rights, and more explicit recognition of public domains.
Firmer commitments could have been extracted to supply technical
assistance and shift enforcement costs onto rich countries and/or
230
multinational firms.
Perhaps other creative concessions could have
been devised, such as differential fee schedules on patent and trademark
applications that could offer Southern innovators greater access to IP

229. See Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II, supra note 96 and accompanying text.
230. See Reichman, supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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231

protection in Northern markets.
It is worth noting, however, that to pre-qualify, such an “alternative
TRIPs” need not have been entirely devoid of distributional skews, at
least in regard to short-term outcomes. In contrast to WIPO, in which
IPR treaties had been blocked, there was ample reason for developing
countries to agree to negotiate some form of IP harmonization in
GATT, even if the burdens were unequal, to eliminate trade frictions
over IP issues and to entice the United States to fully commit to the
Uruguay Round with its promise of agricultural and textile concessions
to come. In this sense, an implicit expectation of linkage would still
have played into their decisions. However, this calculus would
necessarily have remained at least partly speculative.
To be sure, there is a risk that pre-qualification would merely have
frontloaded the logrolling process. The United States might well have
whispered certain promises in the ears of influential Members of the
developing world bloc. Even in domestic contexts, such informal
logrolls cannot be prevented, only discouraged. However, given
logistical constraints and time pressures (and assuming prospective
logrollers are unwilling to openly violate the rules), such understandings
would have to remain private and, thus, contingent on further
negotiations among other interested parties. Pre-qualification would
only be the start of the process. The only matter actually to be decided
at that stage would be whether this specific regulatory proposal would
232
be formally placed on the agenda.
Negotiations on all other nonregulatory issues (and ultimate approval of the regulatory agreement(s)
themselves) would have to await the as-yet uncertain dynamics of the
233
trade round to come.
At minimum, pre-qualification procedures would, thus, significantly
raise the transaction costs of logrolling ex ante versus ex post. Some

231. See Mangeni, supra note 30, at 224.
232. Other regulatory proposals would also be subject to ex ante voting. Because these
proposals would come into play at roughly the same time, agenda-setting logrolls between
them would be inevitable. However, most regulatory deals would have a North-South
dimension requiring non-regulatory offsets in the form of trade concessions. Accordingly,
such purely cross-regulatory logrolls would remain of limited value.
233. In this respect, the temptation to engage in ex ante logrolls in agenda votes would
be less powerful than in domestic contexts in which single-issue, majority voting applies.
Under those conditions, blocking leverage may decline once a bill gains momentum.
Moreover, because tradeoffs cannot be enforced in package deals, legislators need to exact
concrete commitments in advance of their approval. By contrast, under the WTO’s
consensus rules, member states can always play holdout at any stage thereby reducing the
need to settle up front.
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nations might prefer to wait and see before committing themselves.
Moreover, to the extent that ex ante logrolls do occur, the ability of
smaller, less powerful nations to block a specific regulatory proposal
from advancing without jeopardizing the entire round would
redistribute the bargaining leverage in such deals. One might, thus,
expect ex ante logrolls to occur on a more equitable basis.
Furthermore, by separating the pre-qualification decision from the
ultimate decision to approve TRIPs as part of a subsequent package
deal, developing nations would have had every incentive to negotiate
the fairest possible agreement on IP and would have enjoyed maximum
leverage to do so. Decoupling the fiscal implications from the
regulatory merits would arguably permit a broader assessment of longterm welfare, free from mercantilist bias. Potential stakeholders would
have the opportunity to weigh in on the debate and have their interests
taken into account before such calculations became subsumed in the
machinations of the larger trade round, thereby helping to reduce the
risk of capture by special interests. Such ex ante approval would also
234
have gone some ways to blunt post hoc claims of coercion. Moreover,
because the pre-qualified draft would be regarded as close to the final
version, more careful attention could have been paid to drafting issues
than is possible during the fluid negotiations of a typical trade round.
Indeed, some of this work could have been delegated elsewhere, well in
advance of the round, for example, drawing on the technical expertise of
235
WIPO.
Everyone would know exactly what they were getting going
in. As a result, no one could claim later “we wuz robbed.”
E. Escaping the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The real value of the procedural reforms proposed here must be
proven in the post-TRIPs world. Their benefits might be as much
systemic as specific. Trade negotiations, like markets, function better
234. Some coercion claims lodged by TRIPs critics relate to pressure tactics exerted
outside the GATT process, such as U.S. threats of unilateral trade sanctions under section
301, discriminatory use of trade preferences, or indirect pressure through the IMF and World
Bank. See RICHARDS, supra note 79, at 125–31; Drahos, supra note 148, at 169–70. The
inclusion of binding dispute resolution as part of the WTO package has partially defanged
such coercive instruments. However, the realities of geopolitical power are such that external
coercion can never be eliminated entirely.
235. See Abbott, Distributed Governance, supra note 27, at 21–23 (discussing
distributed governance scheme between WIPO and TRIPs); Reichman, supra note 48, at 465
(discussing the same). In this scenario, WIPO would function as something akin to an
external committee, much like the law commissions found in other common law systems and
in some states in the United States.
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when subject to rules. The GATT’s free-wheeling, unstructured
approach appears increasingly inadequate in light of current trade
politics. As trade negotiations continue to grow more complex, with
more Members, more diverse interests, and ever more issues to reckon
with, trade rounds have become protracted ordeals with a centripetal
nature that threatens to spin out of control. The proliferation of linkage
claims poses a particular danger. TRIPs set a powerful precedent that
continues to resonate. Already, a long-line of “me too” issues is jostling
for inclusion.
Some degree of linkage is arguably essential for the WTO to
advance its liberalizing agenda. Yet, the politics of trade linkages are
torn by a mismatch of North-South agendas. Northern governments are
bombarded by interest group pressures to push linkages at every turn.
Southern negotiators, backed by their own NGO allies, have recoiled,
blocking linkage attempts during in the current Doha Round even on
issues that could benefit them—and at the cost of scuttling progress on
236
things they do want, such as liberalization of agriculture. Having felt
burnt by TRIPs, developing nations seem to view any linkage
proposal—however innocuous—as a potential Trojan horse that could
usher in a regulatory fait accompli that they would be powerless to
oppose later.
As the Doha Round grinds to a halt, the WTO cannot afford to
continue on a path of benign neglect. Already, the recent proliferation
of bilateral and regional trade agreements demonstrates a lack of
confidence in the multilateral system and has arguably undermined the
237
commitment to Doha. Even flawed agreements in the WTO might be
preferable to this patchwork of overlapping regulatory regimes. Yet,
the current atmosphere of distrust in the WTO stands in the way.
Linkage is not the only source of this distrust, but it is part of the
problem. The laissez faire conditions under which trade talks operate
offer member states too much room to maneuver and to act
opportunistically. Yet, no one comes out ahead if everyone plays the
same hand. In short, the WTO may be victim to a form of “prisoner’s
dilemma.” The only way to win in the long run is to cooperate. This
requires putting in place procedural rules to which everyone is
committed so that trade talks can proceed under an atmosphere of trust.
Pre-qualification procedures for non-trade regulatory proposals
236. See WTO Under Fire, supra note 51, at 26–28.
237. The World Trade Organization: 10-Year Review: A World Trading System in
Peril?, INT’L REV. (N.Y. Law Sch., Ctr. for Int’l Law, New York, N.Y.), Spring 2005, at 12.
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would be a good place to start. Such procedures would give developing
nations additional maneuvering space and leverage to block linkage
strategies on a more selective basis, without holding up the entire round.
This would help thin the queue of aspiring candidates for regulatory
expansion of the WTO. Future proposals would have to be more
modest in scope, perhaps introduced piecemeal in incremental steps.
Yet, as a confidence-building measure, this might not be a bad thing and
would help to defuse the stalemate that has paralyzed the past two
ministerial meetings at Cancún and Doha. The problem in the WTO
right now might be too little linkage as well as too much. Paradoxically,
imposing procedural discipline on linkage proposals might solve both
problems.
However reasonable these procedural requirements may sound in
theory, one must also consider whether they are politically viable.
Agreeing to these procedural restraints would mean forfeiting the
ability to unilaterally veto trade agendas and limit the freedom of
Members to engage in opportunistic maneuvering. Traditionally,
powerful nations such as the United States have exploited such freedom
to manipulate agendas and to manufacture a consensus around their
238
own self-serving aims.
Yet, other nations are learning to play the
game too. The developing world has proven much more effective at
hanging together during the Doha Round than it did during Uruguay, as
239
the rollback on pharmaceutical patents attests.
As trade negotiations continue to get more complex, the ability of
any one Member to dominate the proceedings has diminished.
Meanwhile, linkage tactics threaten a continued stalemate that is in no
one’s interest. The rules of GATT have grown outdated. They permit
too much license for individual nations to pursue private advantage at a
collective and cumulative cost. By undertaking procedural reforms, the
WTO would free itself from this destructive anarchy of opportunism
and reinvigorate the agenda of global integration.
Even if the specific proposal advanced here is not adopted or
appears inadequate, it is still worth considering these larger procedural
concerns. As the globalization of law shifts more and more regulatory
powers to international institutions, attention to the procedural aspects
of global governance has become a matter of growing importance. This

238. See Helfer, supra note 133, at 21.
239. See WTO Under Fire, supra note 50, at 26 (describing emergence of G-22 bloc of
developing nations at Cancún that presented a common front across issues); Abbott,
Medicines Decision, supra note 161, at 343–44 (same).
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Article engages a small part of a much broader challenge: thinking
about how to craft regulatory responses to global problems in a way that
can be accepted as both legitimate and efficient. The political science
and economy of international lawmaking remains relatively undertheorized. Much can be gained merely by translating insights about
domestic lawmaking to the international context and incorporating
analogous procedures. Yet, as this Article has highlighted, the
international system presents its own unique set of challenges, even
setting aside the considerable diversity encompassed within that term.
How best to meet these challenges remains open to debate.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the use of linkage strategies to advance
regulatory goals in WTO trade rounds represents a double-edged sword.
While enabling cross-issue compensation to neutralize distributional
skews, the practice carries a risk of unintended repercussions. The
TRIPs Agreement demonstrates at least prima facie evidence of adverse
effects both specific and systemic. Uninhibited use of linkage strategies
also invites opportunistic gamesmanship that could have cumulative
impact resulting in paralysis. Accordingly, pre-qualifying procedures to
control the use of linkage should be instituted. By ensuring the precommitment of a geographically balanced supermajority, such
procedures would serve to enhance both the rationality and legitimacy
of the agreements that ultimately result.
Such reforms would not be a panacea.
The challenges of
multinational trade negotiations remain numerous and daunting.
Procedural rules can always be circumvented when powerful actors are
determined to evade them. Linkages would remain problematic even if
these procedures were adhered to, as would regulatory harmonization
even in the absence of linkage. And regulatory linkage is far from the
only contentious item on the WTO’s plate. Nonetheless, the experience
of domestic lawmaking suggests that procedures can make a difference,
even if imperfect or largely symbolic. The WTO would do well to learn
from this example.

